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FORESEEABILITY AND COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh∗ 
Copyright law’s principal justification today is the economic theory of creator incentives.  
Central to this theory is the recognition that while copyright’s exclusive rights framework 
provides creators with an economic incentive to create, it also entails large social costs, and 
that creators therefore need to be given just enough incentive to create in order to balance 
the system’s benefits against its costs.  Yet, none of copyright’s current doctrines enable courts 
to circumscribe a creator’s entitlement by reference to limitations inherent in the very idea of 
incentives.  While the common law too relies on providing actors with incentives to behave 
in certain ways, it recognizes that its incentive structure has outer limits and that failing to 
calibrate an entitlement or liability with these limits in mind is likely to prove inefficient.  
The principal mechanism that it employs to this end is the concept of foreseeability.  
Premised on the idea that individuals do not ordinarily consider consequences that are 
temporally or causally far removed from their actions, foreseeability allows courts to balance 
a regime’s ex ante incentive effects against its ex post costs when determining liability. 
This Article argues that if copyright law is to remain true to its theory of incentives, and 
thereby the need to balance monopoly control with the social costs that are central to the 
theory, it needs to internalize the idea that creators, like actors elsewhere, are incapable of 
fully anticipating all future contingencies associated with their actions, which in turn limits 
the effectiveness of incentives.  To this end, this Article proposes a test of “foreseeable 
copying” to limit copyright’s grant of exclusivity to situations where a copier’s use was 
reasonably foreseeable at the time of creation — the point when the incentive is meant to 
operate.  Adopting a test of foreseeability is thus likely to better align copyright law with its 
underlying purpose and provide courts with a mechanism by which to give effect to 
copyright’s theory of incentives in individual cases — thereby according the theory more 
than just rhetorical significance. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
s an instrumentally driven entitlement, copyright has its limits.  If, 
as most agree, copyright law’s primary purpose lies in providing 
individuals with an incentive to generate creative expression, its grant 
of exclusivity must be limited by that purpose.1  Yet, courts almost 
never look to copyright’s incentive structure in delineating its scope.  
They routinely assume that its property-like nature automatically enti-
tles its holder to internalize all possible benefits associated with the 
work — whether or not the creator was responsible for them beyond 
just creating the work.  This issue becomes most pressing in cases in-
volving markets for new uses — uses that either employ the work in 
the context of a new technology or creatively employ the work for an 
altogether new purpose.2 
An overwhelmingly large number of copyright cases, both histori-
cally and in the recent past, have involved markets for new uses — 
most prominently, uses involving new technologies.3  The printing 
press, photocopiers, cable retransmission, audio and video recorders, 
digital conversion, and filesharing, to name a few, each presented 
copyright law with essentially the same question: do a copyright 
owner’s exclusive rights in a work extend to its use with a new tech-
nology that was not in existence when the work was created?  A 
somewhat similar issue often arises in relation to derivative works, 
where an existent work is modified to create an altogether new one.4  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “To promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their respective Writings and Discoveries”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic 
Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 285 (1996) (“To encourage authors to create and disseminate 
original expression, copyright law accords them a bundle of proprietary rights in their works.”).  
 2 For a discussion of new uses in the context of new technologies, see Jane C. Ginsburg, Copy-
right and Control over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001). 
 3 See, e.g., BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 101–25 (1967) 
(discussing the evolution of copyright in light of contemporary and future technologies); MARK 
ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 3–5 (1993) (discussing the 
emergence of copyright in the era of the printing press).  Many prominent cases have faced the 
question of markets for new uses.  See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 
U.S. 417 (1984) (dealing with the video recorder); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, 
Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (dealing with cable retransmissions); White-Smith Music Publ’g Co. v. 
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) (dealing with the market for piano rolls); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 
336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (dealing with the market for thumbnails of copyrighted photographs); 
Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002) (dealing with the photographic catalog-
ing of plush toys); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 
(dealing with the market for digital music).  Perhaps the best known cases in the recent past in-
clude those filed against Google. See Complaint, McGraw-Hill Co. v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 
8881 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2005); Complaint, Author’s Guild v. Google Inc., No. 05 CV 8136 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2005).  These two cases have been combined for the purposes of a provisional 
settlement agreement.  Settlement Agreement, Author’s Guild, No. 05 CV 8136-JES (Oct. 28, 
2008), http://www.googlebooksettlement.com/Settlement-Agreement.pdf. 
 4 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining a “derivative work”).  
A 
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On most occasions, courts answer this question in the affirmative, ef-
fectively allowing copyright holders to control the development and di-
rection of the new use and thereby the market for it.  Occasionally 
though, they have refused to do so, preferring to draw a limit to copy-
right’s exclusivity and recognizing that a creator’s entitlement does not 
extend to the new use.5  Yet in doing so, they have struggled to ar-
ticulate a coherent, forward-looking principle on which to justify the 
refusal.6 
Of the various theories commonly advanced to justify copyright 
law, the utilitarian incentive-based one continues to dominate among 
scholars, judges, and policymakers.7  In this view, copyright exists 
primarily (if not entirely) to provide creators with an incentive to pro-
duce creative expression through the promise of limited exclusionary 
control over their creative work.  Creators are presumed to be rational 
utility maximizers and therefore capable of being induced to create by 
the prospect of controlling a future market for their yet-to-be-created 
works.  For all its reliance on the idea of creator incentives, though, 
copyright law does very little to instantiate the idea of incentives into 
its entitlement delineation process.  None of copyright’s current doc-
trinal devices enable courts to circumscribe a creator’s entitlement by 
reference to the incentive structure on which the institution is prem-
ised.  As a direct consequence, creators (and their assignees) are often 
thought to be rightfully entitled to any revenue stream associated with 
their creation, whether or not that stream owes its existence solely to 
the creator and regardless of it having been developed well after the 
creation of the work. 
Interestingly, though, the common law has come to recognize that 
there are limits to human predictive capacities that in turn impact the 
extent to which incentives and deterrents influence individual behav-
ior.  And as a consequence, the common law allows its liability and en-
titlement calculations to be shaped by this recognition.  Its principal 
device to this end is the concept of foreseeability.8  In its simplest for-
mulation, foreseeability restricts a party’s recovery by limiting either a 
plaintiff’s entitlement or a defendant’s liability to events and conse-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 5 See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly 
Corp., 392 U.S. 390; RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Sys. Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999).  
 6 See Ginsburg, supra note 2, at 1619–26 (noting courts’ inconsistency in articulating a basis 
for these decisions). 
 7 See infra section II.A, pp. 1577–81. 
 8 The most prominent use of foreseeability has of course been in tort law.  See KENNETH S. 
ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 125 (3d ed. 2007); 3 FOWLER V. 
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 16.9, at 467 (2d ed. 1986); Leon Green, Foreseeability in 
Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961).  For an analysis of its use in other contexts, see 
infra sections III.A.2–5, pp. 1597–1600. 
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quences that were objectively capable of being anticipated at a certain 
point in time. 
In each of the contexts where the common law employs foreseeabil-
ity as a limiting device, its basis for doing so remains somewhat simi-
lar.  As a process, the common law is both backward- and forward-
looking.  On the one hand, it allocates the costs arising from a certain 
event between the litigating parties, but on the other hand, it simulta-
neously attempts to induce future parties to behave in certain ways in 
order to avoid those costs and at times obtain benefits.9  In this latter 
guidance function, the common law looks to how individuals behave 
in different contexts and formulates a set of incentives (entitlements) 
and deterrents (liability) to direct their future actions.10  Foreseeability 
connects here to the notion of bounded rationality.  When certain 
events or consequences are unlikely to have formed a significant part 
of an actor’s decisions for an action, the law characterizes them as un-
foreseeable and avoids attributing them to the actor.  In economic 
terms, foreseeability thus enables courts to distinguish between events 
that are likely to have formed part of an actor’s ex ante incentives for 
action and those that are unlikely to have done so, thereby restricting 
recovery to the former alone. 
Copyright law, much like the common law, is concerned with in-
ducing behavior of a certain kind by incentivizing it.  By providing 
creators with an ex post reward, it attempts to incentivize their ex ante 
production of creative expression.  As an entitlement arising from the 
bilateral context, copyright law is structurally very similar to other 
common law areas.  If the law (in other contexts) readily presumes that 
actors can only ever factor foreseeable consequences into their deci-
sionmaking process, then logically speaking, copyright law should see 
little need to give creators an entitlement to unforeseeable ones.  Copy-
right thus needs to internalize the idea that incentives have limits and 
develop a mechanism by which to eliminate unincentivized gains from 
a creator’s entitlement, especially when including them in the entitle-
ment is likely to produce more costs than benefits. 
This Article argues that, following from the common law’s use of 
foreseeability to mark the outer boundaries of its incentive structure in 
a variety of contexts, copyright law ought to employ a test of foresee-
ability to determine the point up to which a copyright owner should be 
allowed to internalize the gains from his work.  In determining liability 
for infringement, applying a test of foreseeability would require a court 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 9 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the 
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (1984) (describing these as the “ex post” and “ex ante” 
perspectives, respectively). 
 10 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 130 (2d 
ed. 1989) (referring to this as the “incentive question” underlying a rule). 
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to ask whether the use complained of is one that the copyright owner 
(that is, the plaintiff) could have reasonably foreseen at the time that 
the work was created (that is, the point when the entitlement com-
mences).  Adopting an approach along these lines is likely to present 
courts with a solution to the problem of new uses and later-developed 
technologies, and a rational basis on which to mark the outer bounda-
ries of copyright’s grant of exclusive rights — questions that have hi-
therto been resolved entirely on an ad hoc basis. 
Limiting liability for copyright infringement by using foreseeability 
is also likely to transform the way in which courts think about and 
apply the doctrine of fair use.  At present, the doctrine of fair use re-
mains the primary mechanism of distinguishing between uses of the 
work in order to determine over which ones the copyright holder 
should be allowed to claim an exclusive right.11  Courts and scholars 
have over the years developed formulations of the doctrine that speak 
directly to this task, such as “transformative use” and “intrinsic use.”12  
These formulations suffer from a host of well-documented problems, 
almost all of which derive from the structural reality that, as a defense 
to liability, fair use inevitably focuses on the defendant.  In doing so, 
the doctrine ignores altogether the plaintiff’s entitlement, and the rea-
sons for it, once the work is brought into existence.  Tying these ques-
tions to the initial question of liability would serve to mark the outer 
boundaries of copyright exclusivity by connecting it to the ex ante in-
centive that copyright is meant to generate. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II examines copyright law’s 
principal justificatory theory: the theory of creator incentives.  It sets 
out the core assumptions central to the theory, analyzes the failure of 
copyright doctrine to instantiate its avowed reliance on it, and lays out 
the consequence of this failure.  It thus attempts to make the case for a 
new limiting device within copyright law that recognizes how incen-
tives are (and indeed are not) capable of impacting actual decision-
making among creators.  Part III illustrates how the idea of foresee-
ability — used in other contexts to structure actor incentives and limit 
windfalls that are thought to be inefficient or unfair — can serve that 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 11 It remains common consensus among copyright scholars that the fair use doctrine — as it is 
structured and applied today — remains deeply flawed.  See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in a 
Changing World, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 133, 133–34 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, Keynote: 
Fair Use: Threat or Threatened?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 903 (2005); Lydia Pallas Loren, Rede-
fining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (1997); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 
82 B.U. L. REV. 975 (2002); David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair 
Use, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 263; Sara K. Stadler, Copyright As Trade 
Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (2007). 
 12 See LEON E. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24–25, 37–38 
(1978) (identifying certain kinds of uses as “intrinsic”); infra section II.B.2, pp. 1584–89. 
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very purpose.  It begins by looking to foreseeability’s assumptions 
about human predictive capabilities (deriving from the idea of 
bounded rationality) and proceeds to analyze foreseeability’s use in dif-
ferent areas of the law, all in recognition of the limited behavioral 
modification the law expects to induce.  Part IV then attempts to in-
troduce foreseeability to copyright law using a test of “foreseeable 
copying.”  It starts by setting out how the test would operate as part of 
the infringement inquiry and illustrates how, given its use in the licens-
ing context, extending the test to the infringement inquiry is likely to 
present few issues of workability.  Part IV then proceeds to argue that 
a test of foreseeability remains perfectly compatible with, and in many 
ways is mandated by, copyright’s theory of incentives.  Part V re-
sponds to four potential objections to the use of foreseeability as an 
idea in copyright law: (1) that it is likely to render copyright’s current 
term of protection redundant, (2) that it might result in a significant 
amount of indeterminacy in its application, (3) that it will result in 
temporally differentiated entitlements, and lastly, (4) that it will inevi-
tably involve a significant degree of hindsight in its application.  Part 
VI concludes. 
II.  COPYRIGHT LAW AND CREATOR INCENTIVES 
As a property right — understood as a set of exclusive use privi-
leges protected by an exclusionary right — copyright is premised on 
the idea of allowing its holder to capture (or internalize) the benefits 
associated with the use of his work.13  In spite of copyright’s status as 
a property right, its scope and reach remain significantly limited.   
Using a host of internal doctrines, copyright law limits the circum-
stances and ways in which an owner is permitted to exercise its grant 
of exclusivity.14 
While personality- and desert-based theories of copyright abound 
in the literature,15 copyright law in the United States has undeniably 
come to be understood almost entirely in utilitarian, incentive-driven 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 13 For an overview of the copyright-property linkage, see JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFT-
WARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 
(1996); and Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, 
and Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 993, 1046–69 (2006). 
 14 See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consis-
tency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1365–77 (1989).  Some of 
these doctrines include: the idea-expression dichotomy, the originality requirement, the rule of fix-
ation, and the temporally limited nature of the grant.  See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 302–05 (2006).  
 15 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); 
Linda J. Lacey, Of Bread and Roses and Copyrights, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1532; Alfred C. Yen, Restor-
ing the Natural Law: Copyright As Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990); Barbara 
Friedman, Note, From Deontology to Dialogue: The Cultural Consequences of Copyright, 13 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 157 (1994). 
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terms.16  Copyright law is thus thought to exist primarily to give au-
thors (that is, creators) an incentive to create and thereafter dissemi-
nate their works publicly.  But what is perhaps unique about copyright 
law is that, in spite of its avowed adherence to this theory of incen-
tives, its internal doctrinal devices do little to give effect to its theoreti-
cal basis.  Limiting a party’s liability or entitlement by reference to its 
underlying purpose is hardly novel.  Tort law routinely does this.  This 
process is also rather well known in antitrust law.  As part of the anti-
trust injury rule, courts ask whether the injury complained of by a 
plaintiff was of “the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent” 
and arose as a consequence of “that which makes the defendants’ acts 
unlawful.”17  Yet, in interpreting and developing different formulations 
of copyright’s doctrinal devices, courts rarely, if ever, make reference 
to incentives. 
A.  Copyright Incentives in Theory and Practice 
Central to all of copyright law is the idea of incentives.18  Copy-
right, it is argued, exists to provide creators with an incentive to create 
and disseminate their works publicly.  While copyright scholars have 
long attempted to make sense of copyright’s theory of incentives  
and its limitations, in practice courts do surprisingly little to give effect 
to the way in which copyright’s incentive structure is meant to  
influence creativity.  As a consequence, few dispute the fact that copy-
right’s theory of incentives today functions as little more than a trope 
— but ironically enough, one that masks the real tradeoffs that copy-
right involves.19 
Copyright’s incentives story is thought to track the claim about the 
dynamic efficiency of property rights.20  By providing a creator with 
limited exclusionary control over creative expression at time T2, the 
system is thought to encourage the production of such expression at 
time T1.  Since copyright deals with subject matter that is by nature a 
nonexcludable public good, the need for such exclusionary control is 
thought to be particularly pronounced.21 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 16 Indeed, this instrumental mandate derives from copyright’s constitutional origins.  See U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 17 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); see Roger D. Blair & 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1989). 
 18 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003); Joseph P. 
Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 428 (2002). 
 19 See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 
1197, 1198–1204 (1996) (describing the use of incentives rhetoric to justify copyright since its  
inception). 
 20 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF IN-
TELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 13 (2003). 
 21 Id. at 19. 
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All the same, the exclusionary control that copyright confers inter-
feres with the extent to which others may access and use that resource 
in the future.  It thus entails both a static and dynamic inefficiency.22  
By enabling creators to price their works at a monopoly level, it re-
duces access to those works by users willing to pay a price lower than 
that charged by the creator, but above the marginal cost of producing 
it.  This represents a static inefficiency, often referred to as copyright’s 
“deadweight loss.”23  In addition, since creativity is almost always de-
rivative, copyright’s phenomenon of exclusionary control also impedes 
future creativity by restricting access to a creative work for potential 
creators hoping to use the work as an input for a future creative out-
put.  This in turn represents a dynamic inefficiency.24  Copyright thus 
has to balance the benefits of its incentive structure against its access- 
and use-limiting functions, which are costs that it imposes on society 
as a whole.  Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner 
summarize this tradeoff well: 
Unless there is power to exclude, the incentive to create intellectual prop-
erty [that is, creative expression] in the first place may be impaired. . . . 
[T]he result is the “access versus incentives” tradeoff: charging a price for 
a public good reduces access to it (a social cost), making it artificially 
scarce . . . but increases the incentive to create it in the first place, which 
is a possibly offsetting social benefit.25 
This tradeoff was first noted by the economist Kenneth Arrow,26 
and has since been a central theme in almost all scholarly analyses of 
copyright incentives.27  While some have analyzed it as a tradeoff be-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 22 For a concise discussion of these effects, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NET-
WORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 35–37 (2006). 
 23 See Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 99–100 (1997); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1702 (1988). 
 24 See BENKLER, supra note 22, at 36–37. 
 25 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 20–21. 
 26 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIV-
ITY 609 (1962). 
 27 Scholarly work in the copyright area has often focused on the tradeoff and attempted to de-
termine the optimal amount of protection (principally through the idea of price discrimination) as 
a consequence of the tradeoff.  See Fisher, supra note 23, at 1700–05 (“[T]o avoid underproduction 
of original works, it is necessary to empower the creators of such works to charge fees for the 
privilege of using them, but granting the creators that right causes monopoly losses, which vary 
between types of copyrighted works.”  Id. at 1703.); see also Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View 
of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); James Boyle, 
Cruel, Mean, or Lavish? Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellectual Prop-
erty, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. 
L. REV. 1799 (2000); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 
49 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1996); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy: 
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 845, 869–76 (1997); cf. Louis Kaplow, 
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tween two endogenous variables within the copyright system, others 
have argued that it involves a comparison between copyright’s pur-
pose and an exogenous variable.28  Yet in either form, the idea that 
copyright’s incentive structure comes with its own set of limits remains 
well accepted among intellectual property scholars.  While scholars 
certainly disagree on how best to implement these limits — through 
scope, breadth, or temporal restrictions — at a basic level, the incen-
tives analysis in the public goods context is always understood as be-
ing about both expanding and curtailing an exclusionary entitlement.29 
When it comes to implementing the theory, though, courts and po-
licymakers tend to view copyright’s incentive structure in largely lin-
ear (and unipolar) terms.30  In this view, since copyright’s purpose lies 
solely in encouraging creativity, any limitations to it are justifiable only 
if they do not interfere with its incentive structure, which is in turn 
presumed to extend to every marginal incentive.  Additionally, in this 
conception, the incentive provided by copyright’s promise of exclusiv-
ity is also thought to correlate directly with the overall production of 
creative expression.  Professor Jessica Litman aptly notes in describing 
this model that it assumes “[a]n increase in the scope or subject matter 
or duration of copyright . . . will inspire more and better authorship, 
while a limitation on copyright will at the margin result in reduced au-
thorial production.”31  The linear conception thus implies that there 
exists “no good reason” within the very idea of incentives (the model’s 
only frame of reference) for “why copyrights should not cover every-
thing and last forever.”32  Not surprisingly then, one begins to see a 
significant divergence between copyright’s theory of incentives as dis-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813 (1984) (discussing the 
tradeoff in the patent law context). 
 28 For a clear statement of the endogenous version of the tradeoff that identifies incentives and 
access as the twin, progress-driven goals of the copyright system, see Cohen, supra note 27, at 
1801.  Not surprisingly, those who accept the tradeoff in exogenous terms remain less convinced 
of its centrality.  See Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y U.S.A. 1 (1997). 
 29 For a sample of some economic literature debating this question, see WILLIAM D. NORD-
HAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE (1969), which argues that temporal limits best 
capture an incentives analysis.  See also Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990) (arguing that incentives analysis ne-
cessitates limits on a patent’s scope). 
 30 This phenomenon is often referred to as copyright’s “one-way ratchet.”  See Jessica Litman, 
War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 344 (2002); Sara K. Stadler, Incentive and Ex-
pectation in Copyright, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 435 (2007); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: 
How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 543 
(2004); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Adrift in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The Sequel, 
26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 290 (2001). 
 31 Litman, supra note 30, at 344. 
 32 Id. 
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cussed in the literature and the idea of incentives as implemented 
through copyright doctrine. 
Professor Neil Netanel ascribes the popularity of this linear model 
of copyright among courts to the growing influence of what he calls 
the “neoclassicist” school of economics, which takes the neoclassical as-
sumptions of incentives theory as a starting point, but juxtaposes them 
with property ideas in an effort to minimize the transaction costs that 
the system entails.33  The Supreme Court’s leading opinion on fair use, 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,34 is perhaps 
aptly representative of the way in which courts use the idea of incen-
tives in this linear conception.  The question before the Court in 
Harper & Row was whether the defendant’s unauthorized publication 
of quotations from President Gerald Ford’s unpublished manuscript 
was a fair use of the work.35  In concluding that it was not a form  
of fair use, the Court’s analysis focused on the effect that characteriz-
ing the defendant’s actions as a form of fair use would have on copy-
right’s incentive structure.36  In other words, without examining 
whether copyright’s incentive structure extended to the entitlement 
that the plaintiff was claiming, it focused on the harm that the defen-
dant’s actions might have on that ephemeral incentive.  The idea of 
“incentives” provided the Court with a rhetorical framework internal 
to the copyright system by which to justify its decision, rather than a 
meaningful basis with which to understand the very functioning of 
that system.  The Court found it wholly unnecessary to ask whether 
extending copyright’s entitlement to the defendant’s actions was neces-
sitated by its idea of incentives.37 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 Netanel, supra note 1, at 306–07.  More recently, others have referred to this as the “Dem-
setzian” turn in copyright law, a reference to the seminal work by Professor Harold Demsetz de-
scribing the evolution of ownership and property rights as mechanisms to minimize transaction 
costs and internalize both positive and negative externalities associated with certain actions.  See 
Brett M. Frischmann, Evaluating the Demsetzian Trend in Copyright Law, 3 REV. L. & ECON. 
649 (2007).  For a response by Professor Demsetz, see Harold Demsetz, Frischmann’s View of “To-
ward a Theory of Property Rights,” 4 REV. L. & ECON. 127 (2008). 
 34 471 U.S. 539 (1985).  In the twenty-four years since the decision, in excess of fifty federal 
courts have relied on Harper & Row’s fair use analysis in one way or another.  As Professor Fish-
er predicted a few years after the decision in relation to the Court’s reliance on the theory of in-
centives, “[t]he imprimatur of the majority opinion in Harper & Row will undoubtedly contribute 
to the currency and influence of the theory.”  Fisher, supra note 23, at 1689 (citation omitted). 
 35 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542–45. 
 36 Id. at 557–59. 
 37 The Court has, since then, used copyright’s incentive structure purely as a rhetorical device 
on more than one instance.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 (2003) 
(“[C]opyright law serves public ends by providing individuals with an incentive to pursue private 
ones.”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994) (“[S]ubstantial harm to [the 
market for derivatives] would weigh against a finding of fair use, because the licensing of deriva-
tives is an important economic incentive to the creation of originals.” (citation omitted)).  To be 
sure, courts do occasionally treat the incentives-access tradeoff as a meaningful basis by which to 
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In the linear model of incentives, then, courts presume that absent 
exogenously necessitated exceptions, copyright’s ownership structure is 
independently limitless.38  Even if incentives are the reason for the en-
titlement, they exert little influence on its structure.  Neoclassicist 
thinking apart, though, one suspects that a major contributing factor 
to this phenomenon lies in the failure of copyright doctrine to instanti-
ate its theory of incentives in any meaningful way.  Since courts lack a 
meaningful mechanism by which to give effect to the way in which in-
centives operate, and the limitations attendant thereto, they rarely see 
the need to have the idea of incentives play more than just a rhetorical 
role. 
B.  The Absence of Purpose-Driven  
Limits in Copyright Law 
Despite copyright being premised entirely on the idea of incentives, 
courts never look to its theory of incentives in delineating the scope 
and extent of a creator’s entitlement in individual cases.  To the extent 
that they do ever refer to incentives, they do so to examine whether a 
finding of no liability is likely to negatively impact future incentives, 
when ironically enough, the structure of this incentive is never deter-
mined upfront.39 
Copyright remains distinct from other forms of intellectual prop-
erty, in that the absence of an administrative grantmaking entity (such 
as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office) ensures that it falls entirely 
to courts to delineate the scope and extent of a creator’s entitlement.  
In its most basic sense, copyright’s entitlement lies in its promise of ex-
clusivity, a promise that is legally enforceable against interference by 
third parties.  Since courts remain the primary (or rather, sole) deter-
minants of this entitlement in any given situation, they both validate 
the entitlement and enforce it through either a property or liability 
rule.  The process of validation usually entails examining whether the 
work in question meets the eligibility requirements to be protected, 
while the enforcement process then circumscribes the entitlement by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
understand copyright’s incentive structure, but these decisions are rare.  A few notable examples 
include Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); and Suntrust Bank 
v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 38 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 1997) (“In the 
absence of defenses, these exclusive rights normally give a copyright owner the right to seek royal-
ties from others who wish to use the copyrighted work.”); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 
60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1995) (“It is indisputable that, as a general matter, a copyright holder is 
entitled to demand a royalty for licensing others to use its copyrighted work . . . .”); D.C. Comics 
Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[O]ne of the benefits of ownership of 
copyrighted material is the right to license its use for a fee . . . .”). 
 39 See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 598 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 
557. 
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reference to the defendant’s actions.  Both processes operate as limits 
on the entitlement.  While the latter is correlative, the former is in a 
sense absolute.40  Yet, none of the doctrinal devices that courts use  
in either process attempt to connect the entitlement to its underlying 
purpose. 
Copyright’s absolute limiting doctrines concern themselves most di-
rectly with the need to limit a creator’s monopoly power in order to 
minimize the deadweight losses associated with its exercise.41  In one 
sense, they therefore do give effect to the incentives-access tradeoff 
discussed earlier.  Yet, they function by making an a priori assumption 
about where and how that tradeoff should lie, rather than allowing for 
it to be examined in individual cases.  To the extent that they relate to 
incentives, then, they do so in somewhat inflexible, rule-utilitarian 
terms.  The purpose behind their limiting function is therefore largely 
extrinsic to their operation in individual cases, and as a consequence 
they do little to enable courts to circumscribe a creator’s entitlement 
purposively. 
Copyright law’s correlative limiting devices, on the other hand, 
seem better placed to internalize its incentive theory.  Since they in-
volve determining the outer boundaries of a creator’s entitlement only 
by reference to a specific action (the defendant’s), they might be used 
to eliminate from the scope of the entitlement actions that were not 
part of the incentive.  Yet, neither of copyright law’s two principal cor-
relative doctrines — substantial similarity and fair use — rely on its 
attempt to induce creativity. 
1.  Substantial Similarity. — As part of the infringement inquiry, 
the law requires a plaintiff to establish that the defendant copied the 
protected work.42  Absent copying, liability for copyright infringement 
is practically nonexistent.43  While copying certainly does entail a fac-
tual element (whether the defendant took elements of the plaintiff’s 
work), it involves more than just that and carries with it a significant 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 40 By “correlative” here, I mean that the inquiry is done relationally, by reference to the plain-
tiff and the defendant.  The idea of correlativity is generally used to describe tort law’s entitle-
ment structure, where liability is an attempt to connect the defendant’s actions to the plaintiff’s 
harm through the law’s underlying normative goals.  Professor Ernest Weinrib’s account of corre-
lativity is perhaps the most widely accepted exposition of the idea.  See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, 
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995); Ernest J. Weinrib, Punishment and Disgorgement As Con-
tract Remedies, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2003). 
 41 See Sterk, supra note 19, at 1210–13 (1996). 
 42 Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675–76 (1879); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIM-
MER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B] (2007). 
 43 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 8.01[A], at 8-15 (“[A]bsent copying, there can be no 
infringement of copyright, regardless of the extent of similarity.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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normative dimension.44  This occurs as part of the rule of substantial 
similarity, or as some call it, “actionable” copying.45 
The doctrine of substantial similarity requires a plaintiff to estab-
lish not just that the works in question are similar, but that the simi-
larity relates to the fundamental essence or structure of the work un-
der copyright.46  It thus entails establishing that what the defendant 
took from the plaintiff’s work is protected by copyright law to begin 
with.  As one court sought to define the process: “The traditional test 
for substantial similarity is ‘whether the accused work is so similar to 
the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would con-
clude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s pro-
tectible expression by taking material of substance and value.’”47  This 
definition is replete with subjective terms of art (for example, “ordi-
nary reasonable person,” “unlawfully appropriated,” and “substance 
and value”), each of which requires further elucidation for the defini-
tion to be complete.  This result is aptly indicative of the complexity 
that the process entails.48  All the same, courts have over the years 
sought to develop myriad formulations of the test to be applied to in-
dividual cases. 
In attempting to classify these different formulations, Nimmer use-
fully divides them into two broad categories.  The first, “comprehen-
sive nonliteral similarity,” involves situations where the essence of the 
work is copied, even if the copying is not literal (that is, not verba-
tim).49  Here, the tests all focus on extracting the essence of the plain-
tiff’s work without running afoul of the idea-expression dichotomy, 
and then examining whether the defendant’s work copied the same.  
The second category, “fragmented literal similarity,” involves cases 
where the defendant’s work uses parts of the plaintiff’s work.50  The 
copying is literal (that is, verbatim), but partial and dispersed.  Sub-
stantial similarity here, Nimmer argues, cannot be decided except  
by reference to the defendant’s purpose behind the copying, which un-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 44 4 id. § 13.01[B], at 13-8 (noting that “few courts or commentators have historically differen-
tiated” between the factual and normative dimensions of copying (footnote omitted)). 
 45 See id. at 13-9. 
 46 ROBERT C. OSTERBERG & ERIC C. OSTERBERG, SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN COP-
YRIGHT LAW § 1:1, at 1-1 to -4 (2008). 
 47 Country Kids ’N City Slicks, Inc. v. Sheen, 77 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Ata-
ri, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982)). 
 48 See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 1:1, at 1-2 (“Substantial similarity is an 
elusive concept.”); see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d 
Cir. 1960) (L. Hand, J.) (noting that the determination must “inevitably be ad hoc”). 
 49 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.03[A][1], at 13-36. 
 50 Id. § 13.03[A][2]. 
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fortunately is a question usually reserved for the fair use inquiry.51  
Consequently, courts usually focus on whether what the defendant 
took was of significant value to the plaintiff’s (though not the defen-
dant’s) work in determining whether to characterize the copying as 
substantial. 
What should be most apparent from these tests, though, is that the 
substantial similarity test always involves comparing the works them-
selves.52  To the limited extent that it looks to the defendant’s use or 
purpose, it does so exclusively to compare the components of the two 
similar works.53  Nowhere does it look to the plaintiff’s purpose or in-
tent in creating the work to elucidate a possible incentive and compare 
it in turn to the defendant’s.  Thus, while it relates the defendant’s (in-
fringing) work to the plaintiff’s protected one, any inquiry into copy-
right’s overall purpose (generally or specifically) is considered alto-
gether extraneous. 
2.  Fair Use. — Questions of purpose are ordinarily understood as 
being a part of the fair use inquiry.  Using a list of four statutorily de-
lineated nondispositive factors, courts have significant leeway to con-
clude that a defendant’s use of the copyrighted work is insufficiently 
harmful to the plaintiff’s interests.54  While the fair use inquiry was 
originally meant to focus on parties’ purposes in using the work, in 
practice it too places large reliance on the amount and significance of 
the defendant’s copying, with the result that an independent substan-
tial similarity requirement often becomes superfluous or subsumed 
within the fair use inquiry. 
Further, even as a recognized limit on a creator’s property interest 
in the expression, fair use exhibits several structural infirmities.  Per-
haps the most important of these lies in the fact that it is an “affirma-
tive defense,” meaning that the burden is placed on the defendant to 
prove that his use satisfies some or all of the statutory requirements.55  
This is unlike even the rule of substantial similarity, which, as an ele-
ment of the infringement inquiry, is a recognized part of the plaintiff’s 
burden.  The doctrine thus works to limit the copyright grant by de-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 51 Id. at 13-54.  He notes that, as a consequence, the line between the two requirements often 
gets blurred.  But see Nelson v. PRN Prods., Inc., 873 F.2d 1141, 1143 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting an 
attempt to conflate the two and alter the burden of proof). 
 52 See OSTERBERG & OSTERBERG, supra note 46, § 2:1, at 2-1 (observing that substantial 
similarity always entails a “comparison of the works”). 
 53 The substantial similarity requirement is applied even to derivative works, which by their 
very nature involve a different purpose, pointing to the general irrelevance of the purpose and use 
to which the work is put.  See id. § 15:1, at 15-1, 15-2 n.2. 
 54 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).  In general terms the four factors are: (1) the purpose and char-
acter of the defendant’s use; (2) the nature of the protected work; (3) the amount and substantial-
ity of the portion of the work used; and (4) the impact of the defendant’s actions on the actual and 
potential market for the protected work.  Id. 
 55 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 12.11[F]. 
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pending entirely on the defendant’s ability to convince a court that his 
activities are unlikely to impact a creator’s otherwise protected inter-
est.  The copyright owner is thus deemed entitled to internalize all 
possible benefits, until the fair use determination concludes other-
wise.56  In focusing on this presumptive entitlement by itself, fair use 
does very little in practice to link the defendant’s actions (that is, copy-
ing) with the creator’s original incentive. 
While fair use is today codified in the Copyright Act,57 its intrinsic 
open-endedness has resulted in few general principles being discernible 
in both its theory and its practice.  Courts have characterized fair use 
as the “most troublesome [doctrine] in the whole law of copyright”58 
and as “defy[ing] definition.”59  Yet, a few specific formulations stand 
out that might be thought to have some connection to copyright’s in-
centive structure. 
(a)  Transformative Use or Purpose. — Since the first part of the 
fair use test revolves around the “purpose” for which the defendant 
uses the protected work,60 some have suggested that courts should look 
beyond just the binary distinction between the commercial and non-
commercial nature of the defendant’s use to answer this question.  The 
transformative use test requires courts to examine whether a use com-
plained of is transformative, in its being “productive” and “employ[ing] 
the [protected] matter in a different manner or for a different purpose 
from the original.”61  Under this approach, courts are to see if the de-
fendant’s use adds value to the plaintiff’s original use — value being 
understood outside of its purely commercial sense.62 
At first glance, one might see “transformative use” as having some 
connection to creator incentives, especially in its reliance on parties’ 
purposes in using the work.  If a defendant’s use is so different (that is, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 Thus, if the defendant were not to raise the defense, courts would operate on the assump-
tion that the plaintiff is entitled to control the market in which the defendant is operating.  For a 
recent example, see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Cablevision Systems Corp., 478 F. Supp. 
2d 607 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  There, the defendant agreed not to raise the defense of fair use, id. at 
616, with the consequence that the court merely had to conclude that the defendants had copied 
or performed the plaintiff’s work.  See id. at 616, 622. 
 57 Interestingly, fair use originated as a common law doctrine, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 
342 (1841), and was codified in the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 58 Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); see also Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 475 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 59 Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1392 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(quoting Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)) (internal quo-
tation mark omitted). 
 60 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 61 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
 62 Id.  The Supreme Court endorsed Judge Leval’s test in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 
510 U.S. 569 (1994), drawing a distinction between superseding and transformative uses of a work 
based on market substitution.  See generally Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Eco-
nomics: A Misunderstood Relation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 711–12 (2007). 
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transformative) from the plaintiff’s, one might think it illogical to con-
clude that the possibility of controlling it was any part of the plaintiff’s 
ex ante incentive.  In reality, though, the existence of a transformative 
purpose is only ever understood through the content and never as an 
independent variable.63  Thus, for uses that do not directly interact 
with the substantive content of the work (by either altering it directly, 
critiquing or commenting on it, or summarizing it), the transformative 
use test becomes somewhat meaningless.64  Uses that involve convert-
ing a work from one format to another (regardless of what this en-
tails),65 or that employ large portions of it within a broader business 
model (for example Google’s Library Project66), are unlikely to satisfy 
even the transformative use standard.67 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 The Second Circuit’s decision in Castle Rock Entertainment v. Carol Publishing Group, 
Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998), is aptly illustrative of this trend.  In concluding that the defen-
dant’s use of the protected work, which involved creating an aptitude test centering around a 
well-known television series, was not a form of transformative use, the court concluded that the 
defendant had failed to discharge its burden of showing that its use involved a significant “trans-
formative purpose.”  Id. at 143.  Without specifying what a legitimate transformative purpose en-
tailed, the court concluded that since the defendant’s work was substantially similar to the plain-
tiff’s and had only “minimally alter[ed]” it, there was no legitimate transformative purpose.  Id.  
The purpose, in other words, was to be examined via the content.  See Matt Williams, Recent 
Second Circuit Opinions Indicate that Google’s Library Project Is Not Transformative, 25 CAR-
DOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 318 (2007) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Campbell 
is necessarily restricted to such an examination). 
 64 This conclusion derives from the Court’s emphasis in Campbell on the fact that the test is 
whether the defendant creates a “new work [that] is ‘transformative,’” by “altering the first with 
new expression, meaning, or message.”  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (quoting Leval, supra note 61, 
at 1111); see also Stadler, supra note 11, at 906–07 (noting how the Campbell Court intended the 
standard to apply only when a defendant “takes expression from a copyrighted work and adds 
expression of her own”); Williams, supra note 63, at 319–30.  Additionally, cases that have found 
the standard to have been satisfied seem to emphasize this fact.  See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 
244 (2d Cir. 2006); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006).  
  Two recent decisions of the Ninth Circuit, however, seem to have glossed over this require-
ment altogether.  It is not clear that they apply the test as formulated in Campbell.  See Perfect 10, 
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 
(9th Cir. 2003); see also 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:21, at 10-79 n.33 
(2008) (characterizing the Kelly holding as “novel” and its reliance on public benefit as part of the 
transformative use test as “perplexing”); Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright 
Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 575, 619 n.254 (2005) (noting that the Kelly decision “sits uneasily” 
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “transformative”); Williams, supra note 63, at 317–19 
(characterizing the Kelly case as a “misapplication”). 
 65 Thus, translations of a work from one language to another have been held insufficient to 
meet the standard.  See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 
72 (2d Cir. 1999).  Converting a work from one media format to another is considered equally 
nontransformative.  See, e.g., Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 
1998); see also Hughes, supra note 64, at 619 n.254 (“[I]t is the work, not the distribution mecha-
nism, that needs to be transformative.”). 
 66 See generally Jonathan Band, The Google Library Project: Both Sides of the Story, 1 PLA-
GIARY 1, 3–7 (2007) (describing Google’s fair use argument in the actual litigation). 
 67 See Williams, supra note 63, at 330–32.  
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Transformative use, as it is understood today, does nothing to con-
nect fair use to a creator’s incentive.  The overbearing emphasis placed 
on the work itself, and the rendering of the “purpose” element of the 
test practically meaningless, aptly reflect this. 
(b)  Market Failure. — The second and arguably more influential 
attempt to give the fair use doctrine a rational basis employs an eco-
nomic model of market failure and is commonly associated with the 
work of Professor Wendy Gordon.68  In this conception, the fair use 
doctrine exists exclusively to remedy situations of market failure.69 
Fair use, in this formulation, is to be permitted by courts only when 
(1) the existence of a market failure is shown; (2) a defendant’s access 
to (and use of) the work is socially desirable; and, most important for 
our purposes, (3) it would not interfere substantially with the plain-
tiff’s original incentive.70  On the face of it, the market failure model 
appears to relate fair use to creators’ incentives in its third require-
ment.  On closer analysis, though, it does not.  Much like its assump-
tion about the creator’s original entitlement, the model starts from the 
assumption that a creator’s incentive lies in unfettered control over all 
possible uses and that anything that detracts from such control is nec-
essarily an interference with that incentive.  The creator’s entitlement 
is thus thought to consist of all market-based uses of a work; anything 
short of that is presumed to be an insufficient inducement.  Yet the 
market failure model does not give us a basis for this assumption, ex-
cept in terms of a general preference for authors.71  The market failure 
model, then, does little more than refer to the potential impact that a 
finding of noninfringement might have on the incentive, and does little 
to tell us what the contours of that incentive are. 
(c)  Time-based Proposals. — More recently, others have argued 
that a commitment to copyright’s incentive structure necessitates cali-
brating the fair use analysis to fluctuations in the market value for a 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 68 See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of 
the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter Gordon, 
Fair Use].  The dissenting opinion in Sony Corp. (arguing that the defendant’s use was not fair 
use) relies on Gordon’s article.  See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  More recently, Gordon has clarified her position.  See 
Wendy J. Gordon, Market Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 
B.U. L. REV. 1031 (2002). 
 69 Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 68, at 1614–15; Robin A. Moore, Note, Fair Use and Innova-
tion Policy, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 944, 950 (2007). 
 70 Gordon, Fair Use, supra note 68, at 1614. 
 71 The following is perhaps illustrative: 
New technologies will make certain copyrighted works more valuable . . . .  If copyright 
protection is denied because of an otherwise curable market failure, then the additional 
revenues that would have flowed from the new technological use will not appear.  If the 
authors’ revenues fail to reflect the additional value that new technology gives to such 
works, then insufficient resources may be drawn into their creation. 
Id. at 1621. 
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creative work across its lifespan.72  Professor Justin Hughes, for in-
stance, notes that the fair use analysis needs to look to the present val-
ue of a work at the time the decision was made to invest into its crea-
tion or distribution.73  Hughes’ argument recognizes that fair use in its 
current iteration does absolutely nothing to connect a creator’s enti-
tlement to the ex ante incentive.  All the same, his proposal would do 
no more than have courts be more accepting of fair use arguments as a 
work grows older, rather than have them concretely adhere to the idea 
of creator incentives in constructing the initial entitlement.74  His solu-
tion thus does not quite force copyright to be “true to [its] ex ante in-
centive structure,” as he claims it should.75 
(d)  Limiting the Elusive Fourth Factor. — Perhaps more impor-
tantly, though, courts too have occasionally tried to understand fair use 
as a purpose-driven limit on creators’ entitlement.  Yet, this purpose 
has never directly been tied to a creator’s ex ante incentive.  In the 
context of the fourth statutory fair use factor, which requires identify-
ing a potential market for the plaintiff’s work and the impact of the 
defendant’s use on that market,76 plaintiffs often seek to argue that 
their market entitlement includes a market for licenses to use the 
work.77  In this construction, every use of the work by the defendant 
has a substitutive effect on the plaintiff’s market — for even if the 
plaintiff’s use is not in direct competition with the defendant’s, the 
plaintiff’s ability to license that use certainly is.78 
To avoid this circularity, courts have occasionally observed that the 
market inquiry needs to be limited to “traditional, reasonable, or likely 
to be developed” markets for the work.79  All the same, without an 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 72 See Hughes, supra note 18, at 778.  A somewhat more elaborate version of the proposal was 
made around the same time by Professor Joseph Liu.  See Liu, supra note 18.  Yet, unlike Hughes, 
Liu bases his proposal not on the need to bring copyright doctrine closer to its theory of incen-
tives, but rather on the problems associated with the extension of copyright’s term of protection.  
Id. at 411–12 & n.10 (noting this difference). 
 73 Hughes, supra note 18, at 782–83. 
 74 Id. at 778. 
 75 Id. at 782. 
 76 See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006) (listing as a factor for fair use “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work”). 
 77 See, e.g., Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 1997); Princeton 
Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1388 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929–30 (2d Cir. 1994).  
 78 For more on this circularity problem, see 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, 
§ 13.05[A][4], at 13-196 to -198; Matthew Africa, The Misuse of Licensing Evidence in Fair Use 
Analysis: New Technologies, New Markets, and the Courts, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1145, 1160 (2000); 
Fisher, supra note 23, at 1671; Mark Lemley, Should a Licensing Market Require Licensing?, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 185, 190; Loren, supra note 11, at 38–41; Lunney, 
supra note 11, at 1021; and Stadler, supra note 11, at 903–04. 
 79 Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 (1985) (using a similar “normal market” criterion). 
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identifiable basis by which to identify a market as traditional or rea-
sonable, the limit becomes meaningless.  How and when should this 
determination be made?  Courts have thus based the determination on 
plaintiffs’ post-creation ability, motive, interest, or expectation to enter 
a certain market — but never on their ex ante incentive in creating the 
work, which is the inducement that copyright is meant to be about.  
Unless “traditional” or “reasonable” are related back to the time of cre-
ation — the point when the incentive to create is meant to operate — 
they bear little connection to the idea of creator incentives.80 
Fair use in its myriad formulations, both judicial and academic, 
thus remains a weak basis by which to limit copyright by reference to 
its underlying theory of incentives.  Indeed, the complexity and inco-
herence that its jurisprudence seems to have generated might be 
enough reason to look elsewhere. 
C.  The Social Costs of Copyright Windfalls 
To reiterate, because there exists no independent basis by which 
courts can relate copyright’s entitlement structure to its underlying 
purpose, markets that use the work in ways that are unlikely to have 
formed a significant part of the creator’s incentive in creating it are 
nonetheless deemed part of the creator’s exclusionary entitlement.  
Uses for a work that are either temporally or causally disconnected 
from the creator’s actions inevitably then get attributed and allocated 
to the creator. 
In numerous other contexts, courts and scholars have long charac-
terized as windfalls the unexpected gains and losses that accrue to in-
dividuals independent of any possible effort they could have exerted to 
bring them about.81  Central to the idea of a windfall is the recognition 
that the actual value of an event after its occurrence is far in excess of 
its estimated value before it occurs, such that an individual is unlikely 
to have been incentivized to bring it about (or avoid it).82  Windfalls 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 80 As a historical matter, interestingly, the common law standard seems to have required relat-
ing fair use to the time of publication.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 550 (“[The] fair use doc-
trine was predicated on the author’s implied consent to ‘reasonable and customary’ use when he 
released his work for public consumption.” (emphasis added)).  
 81 See Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1491 (1999) (defining windfalls as “eco-
nomic gains independent of work, planning, or other productive activities that society wishes to 
reward” (emphasis omitted)). 
 82 See Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman & Steve Thel, Of Equal Wrongs and Half 
Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 756 (2007) (describing windfalls in terms of the perceivable costs 
and benefits of undertaking an action to bring about or avoid an event).  Professors Parcho-
movsky, Siegelman, and Thel connect their description to tort law’s well-known formulation of 
incentives to take care (that is, the Learned Hand formula).  Id. at 756 n.66.  Thus windfalls rep-
resent situations where the costs C of bringing about an event causally exceed the expected bene-
fits from the event, measured by the probability of its occurrence P multiplied by any gains G 
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thus represent unincentivized gains and losses that were neither ob-
tainable nor avoidable ex ante.  In this sense, then, providing creators 
with an entitlement beyond what would have incentivized them in the 
creative process represents a similar windfall.83 
Why is this necessarily harmful?  As an exclusionary mechanism 
over an otherwise nonrivalrous resource, copyright is known to impose 
significant social costs.  As noted earlier, it creates both static and dy-
namic inefficiencies, encourages rent-seeking, and entails costs associ-
ated with its enforcement by courts.84  In general, these costs are be-
lieved to be outweighed by the social benefits that the system 
produces, in the nature of the inducement to produce creative works  
of expression, rendering them tolerable.85  In relation to windfalls, 
though, these costs are not necessarily counterbalanced by the incen-
tive to create, since these windfalls represent, by their very nature, un-
incentivized gains.  To be sure, windfalls do occur in other contexts 
and are very often tolerated when they are thought unlikely to inter-
fere significantly with an institution’s overall goals and purposes.86 
In practical terms, copyright windfalls allow creators to engage in 
monopolistic pricing in new markets that are unlikely to have formed a 
crucial part of their incentives in creating the work.  In addition, in re-
lation to new uses and later-developed technologies, these windfalls 
give creators control over markets that they clearly are not best posi-
tioned to develop.  Thus, providing creators with control over new 
mediums of distribution87 or new devices that use their creations88 
(both of which are usually developed by third parties) does little more 
than actively facilitate a potential holdout, raising the transaction costs 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
from the event, in the ex ante world.  Cex ante > G·P.  The expected benefits are therefore insuffi-
cient ex ante to independently generate an incentive to bring about the event causally. 
 83 Indeed, in Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985), a dissenting minority of four 
justices made the exact same argument.  Id. at 187–88 (White, J., dissenting).  The Court there 
was concerned with the allocation of royalties between an author and a publisher following the 
partial termination of a license.  The work had been created and licensed well in advance of the 
Copyright Act of 1976, which extended the term of protection by an additional period.  Id.  Con-
sequently, the parties could not have acted in “reliance” on the additional benefits since they were 
not anticipated, and the gains thus represented a “windfall” that needed to be allocated.  Id. at 
188. 
 84 See Wendy J. Gordon & Robert G. Bone, Copyright, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 189, 194–96 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Mark A. Lemley, 
Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1058–59 (2005) (elaborat-
ing on these costs). 
 85 See William W. Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1203, 1249 (1998). 
 86 See Kades, supra note 81, at 1521. 
 87 See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); see also Tim Wu, Copyright’s Com-
munications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 279 (2004). 
 88 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
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for developers of new media and devices and stifling innovation in the 
process. 
III.  FORESEEABILITY AND LIMITS TO INCENTIVES 
If copyright is to be true to its theory of incentives, it needs a doc-
trinal device that limits its grant of exclusivity by reference to the ex 
ante incentive that it is meant to generate.  In a host of other areas, the 
common law employs incentives to produce behavioral modification 
among individuals, and in the process actively employs a device to ob-
jectively shape its incentive structure and balance its ex ante purpose 
against its ex post effects: foreseeability.  Foreseeability is commonly 
understood as “[t]he quality of being reasonably anticipatable.”89  In 
the common law, however, courts use it to identify the point beyond 
which the possibility of an entitlement or liability accruing is unlikely 
to have influenced an actor’s ex ante behavior, thereby rendering the 
occurrence unforeseeable — or, a windfall.  Windfalls thus represent 
unincentivized gains and losses, and the law uses foreseeability to dis-
lodge them from the liability or entitlement determination.  Foresee-
ability is thus likely to provide copyright law with a logical basis  
by which to limit its grant of exclusivity by reference to the idea of  
incentives. 
A.  Foreseeability and the Common Law 
Foreseeability provides courts with a basis on which to mark the 
outer boundaries of liability in different contexts, by differentiating be-
tween events that were likely to have been anticipated by individuals 
and those that were not.  It is worth emphasizing, though, that fore-
seeability adds little normative content on its own.  In other words, the 
reasons why only events or outcomes that could have been anticipated 
ought to be attributed to an actor as part of the liability or entitlement 
determination remain external to the idea of foreseeability itself.  They 
derive instead from the different policies and principles underlying the 
legal regime in question. 
Across different areas of the common law, foreseeability does ex-
hibit one important functional similarity.  This similarity relates to the 
common law’s use of economic incentives to regulate future behavior.  
While the common law is concerned with the allocation of losses aris-
ing from an event, its basis for doing so is at the same time forward-
looking.90  It thus attempts additionally to induce loss-avoiding (or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 89 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 660 (7th ed. 1999). 
 90 Some scholars refer to this process as the “social engineering” function of the common law.  
See Howard A. Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, 73 CAL. L. REV. 
677, 677 n.2 (1985).  Others refer to it as an issue of incentives.  See POLINSKY, supra note 10, at 
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cost-minimizing) behavior by similarly situated actors in the future.91  
The possibility of liability for harm, or indeed the absence of the same, 
is thought to provide rational individuals with an incentive to modify 
their behavior ex ante, that is, prior to the occurrence of the chain of 
events that would result in the harm.  The same holds true for bene-
fits.  The likelihood of a benefit-maximizing entitlement, the common 
law assumes, will lead actors to modify their behavior in such a way as 
to be able to claim the entitlement. 
Interestingly, though, the behavioral modification that the law ex-
pects as a result of this incentive effect is not infinite.  Foreseeability 
comes into play here.  The law recognizes that given what individuals 
are cognitively capable of factoring into their ex ante decisionmaking, 
events that are incapable of being anticipated — and consequently the 
costs and benefits associated with them — are likely to have little in-
fluence on their decisions.  It thus characterizes them as unforeseeable, 
in the recognition that they form no part of individuals’ ex ante incen-
tives for action. 
What implicitly seems to motivate the common law’s deployment 
of foreseeability across different areas, however, is a common under-
standing of the way in which individuals process information under 
conditions of extreme uncertainty.  This understanding is connected to 
the idea of “bounded rationality.”92  Bounded rationality is today 
commonly associated with the field of behavioral economics and is 
used there to refer to the empirical task of identifying various cogni-
tive shortcuts or biases that individuals use in their decisionmaking — 
shortcuts that often result in inefficient (or suboptimal) outcomes.93  
Independent of its use there, however, bounded rationality also refers 
to a basis by which to comprehend the ways in which individuals be-
have in situations of complexity and uncertainty.  Its use in this con-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
130; Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives To Take Care Under the Negligence Rule, 18 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 427 (1989). 
 91 See Latin, supra note 90, at 677 (laying out the basic postulates of the idea of behavioral 
modification). 
 92 Professor Herbert Simon is credited with developing the idea of bounded rationality, begin-
ning in the 1950s.  See Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 
99 (1955); Herbert A. Simon, Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Politi-
cal Science, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 293 (1985); Herbert A. Simon, On the Behavioral and Ra-
tional Foundations of Economic Dynamics, 5 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 35 (1984); Herbert A. 
Simon, Rationality in Psychology and Economics, 59 J. BUS. S209 (1986). 
 93 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Bi-
ases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).  For work extending these ideas to the analysis of law, see Chris-
tine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051 (2000); 
and Thomas S. Ulen, The Growing Pains of Behavioral Law and Economics, 51 VAND. L. REV. 
1747 (1998).  See also RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DE-
CISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
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text is seen most prominently in the economics of organization, also re-
ferred to as transaction cost economics (TCE), beginning with the 
work of Professor Oliver Williamson.94  Here, the idea operates as a 
descriptive (rather than empirical) claim about the way in which indi-
viduals do and do not process information.  Since individuals are inca-
pable of predicting all future contingencies associated with their ac-
tions, they are believed to act in ways that reflect this limitation 
(referred to by some as “predictive uncertainty”95).  Predictive uncer-
tainty is especially applicable when events are highly complex, or in-
deed stochastic.96  Organizational economics uses this idea as a prem-
ise by which to understand all contracting as necessarily incomplete, as 
far as future contingencies go.97 
More importantly, though, what remains distinctive about the use 
of bounded rationality in this organizational context is that here it re-
mains perfectly compatible with the basic idea that actors are indeed 
utility maximizers.  The inability to foresee (or predict) the future is 
taken to be a transaction cost on which the system attempts to econo-
mize.98  The only modification it thus makes is to say that individuals 
have limited information in situations of uncertainty or complexity, 
causing them in turn to economize with this limited information rather 
than acquire additional information to eliminate this uncertainty.  The 
distinction between the idea here and its use in the modern context of 
behavioral economics is that the latter is concerned directly with “deci-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 94 See OLIVER WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS: MERGERS, CONTRACTING, AND 
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR 74–78 (1987); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR-
CHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 21–26 (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The 
New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 600 
(2000) (“There is close to unanimity within the [new institutional economics] on the idea of limited 
cognitive competence — often referred to as bounded rationality.”). 
 95 For uses of this term in different contexts deriving from bounded rationality, see RICHARD 
R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE 
88 (1982); Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism, 6 
BERKELEY BUS. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 9, on file with the Harvard Law School 
Library); and Tomas Hellström & Merle Jacob, Uncertainty and Values: The Case of Environ-
mental Impact Assessment, 9 KNOWLEDGE & POL’Y 70, 76 (1996).  
 96 Indeed, its use in this context has spawned a secondary body of literature attempting to un-
derstand the role it plays in the overall analysis.  See, e.g., John Conlisk, Why Bounded Rational-
ity?, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 669 (1996); Nicolai J. Foss, Bounded Rationality in the Econom-
ics of Organization: Present Use and (Some) Future Possibilities, 5 J. MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 
401 (2001); Oliver Hart, Is “Bounded Rationality” an Important Element of a Theory of Institu-
tions?, 146 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 696 (1990).  Some scholars additionally 
attempt to distinguish between bounded rationality and “indeterminacy,” the situation where mul-
tiple solutions to a single problem exist.  See, e.g., Roy Radner, Bounded Rationality, Indetermi-
nacy, and the Theory of the Firm, 106 ECON. J. 1360 (1996).  
 97 See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 115 (1999); Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Con-
tracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 83 (1999).  
 98 See Maskin & Tirole, supra note 97, at 83–84. 
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sion processes” — the ways in which individuals react to contingencies 
— while the former is directed at modeling “governance structures” 
and economizing on costs as part of that process.99  In the latter con-
text, it thus functions principally as an explanatory vehicle internal to 
the standard economic account of the law rather than as an empirical 
assertion about individuals being irrational in their behavior.100 
It is in this second, limited context — via the idea of predictive un-
certainty — that foreseeability connects to bounded rationality.  It in-
stantiates the idea across two (often interconnected) dimensions: one 
causal, and the other temporal.  Individuals are thought incapable of 
anticipating all the consequences that their actions cause, especially 
consequences that extend far into the future.  Foreseeability thus re-
quires a court to evaluate future uncertain events as they would have 
occurred to the individual at the time the decision to act was made 
and to classify those events and outcomes into (1) those that were ca-
pable of being causally and temporally anticipated at the time (fore-
seeable) and (2) those that were not (unforeseeable).  The law then fac-
tors only those likely to be anticipated during the decisionmaking 
process into the liability or entitlement determination.  This general 
framework characterizes the common law’s use of foreseeability across 
numerous areas. 
1.  Tort Law: Negligence. — Foreseeability is perhaps most promi-
nently used in the area of tort law, specifically in the context of liabil-
ity for negligence.  Foreseeability is used to determine the existence of 
a duty of care to the plaintiff, or alternatively the existence of proxi-
mate causation between the defendant’s actions and the harm 
caused.101  In both contexts, it helps courts draw an outer limit to 
causal attribution. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 99 See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 46 
(1985). 
 100 Indeed, Williamson notes that the use of bounded rationality in the organizational context 
actually “enlarges . . . the scope for rationality analysis” in the traditional economic account.  
Oliver E. Williamson, Assessing Contract, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 177, 180 (1985).  Some refer to 
this as the “thin” conception of bounded rationality, as opposed to its use as a “thick” conception 
in the world of behavioral economics.  See Nicolai J. Foss, Bounded Rationality in the Economics 
of Organization: “Much Cited and Little Used,” 24 J. ECON. PSYCH. 245, 246 (2003); Foss, supra 
note 96, at 402.  Indeed, some believe that since it does little independent work in the analysis, its 
use is somewhat unnecessary.  See Hart, supra note 96, at 700–01.  Yet, as its advocates continue 
to emphasize, it provides rhetorical support to an otherwise intuitive part of the basic model.  
Foss, supra note 96, at 406.  It is in principally the same vein that I attempt to connect it to the 
idea of foreseeability.  Additionally, scholars in the tradition of organizational economics attempt-
ing to model bounded rationality in legal terms have long made this connection in the literature.  
See Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 
6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 157 (1977) (“The foreseeability requirement may only make sense if we 
introduce the concept of ‘bounded rationality.’”). 
 101 See W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 747–50, 755–67 
(2005). 
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In the context of the duty of care, courts ask whether the plaintiff 
in question was within the scope of the duty imposed on the defen-
dant.  They limit the duty of care owed by reference to the conse-
quences that were foreseeable at the time the risk was created.102  
Proximate cause, on the other hand, attempts to connect the defen-
dant’s conduct to the plaintiff’s injury by eliminating from the liability 
calculus consequences whose attribution to the defendant would be 
impractical or unjust.103  Foreseeability reappears here, when courts 
assert that proximate causation does not exist because the injury that 
occurred was not foreseeable to the defendant.104 
In both contexts, foreseeability helps courts “sort[] consequences in-
to the set of those payable by the tortfeasor, and the set of those found 
too distant . . . to be attributed to the tortfeasor.”105  In the absence of 
this sorting, tort liability would be unlimited.  Individuals would be 
liable for outcomes that could be attributed to them through an unend-
ing chain of factual events.106  Foreseeability limits such absurdities. 
Through a system of liability, tort law attempts to create an ex ante 
incentive for individuals to take adequate precautionary measures and 
exercise due care when their actions entail risks.  When the cost of li-
ability (multiplied by the probability of its occurrence) exceeds the cost 
of precaution or prevention, it is thought to generate an incentive for 
due care.107  Unforeseeable consequences, disastrous as they may be, 
are characterized by low probabilities of occurrence and possibly addi-
tional costs associated with detecting, predicting, and guarding against 
them.108  Liability for unforeseeable consequences is thus unlikely to 
create an incentive for greater care, because rational individuals will 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 102 See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). 
 103 See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 180, at 443 (2001); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984) (“‘Proximate 
Cause’ — in itself an unfortunate term — is merely the limitation which the courts have placed 
upon the actor’s responsibility for the consequences of the actor’s conduct. . . . Some boundary 
must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of jus-
tice or policy.”).  
 104 See, e.g., Ballard v. Uribe, 715 P.2d 624, 628 n.6 (Cal. 1986) (en banc); Neering v. Ill. Cent. 
R.R. Co., 50 N.E.2d 497, 503 (Ill. 1943); Osborne v. Atl. Ice & Coal Co., 177 S.E. 796, 796 (N.C. 
1935); Mudrich v. Standard Oil Co., 90 N.E.2d 859, 863 (Ohio 1950); Read v. Scott Fetzer Co., 990 
S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1998); Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 478 (Tex. 
1995).  
 105 Saul Levmore, The Wagon Mound Cases: Foreseeability, Causation, and Mrs. Palsgraf, in 
TORTS STORIES 129, 132 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 
 106 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 103, § 41, at 264 (noting that “the consequences of an act 
go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and be-
yond,” so that the lack of a limiting rule “would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts”). 
 107 See id. § 4, at 25–26. 
 108 For an elaboration of this idea, see Mark F. Grady, Proximate Cause and the Law of Negli-
gence, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 385–91 (1984); and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Re-
course in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 46–47 (1998). 
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not factor them into their risk-creating activities.109  Allowing recovery 
for them would result in a costly transfer payment rather than a bene-
ficial allocative effect.110  Negligence law therefore eliminates unfore-
seeable consequences from the calculus.  This omission is attributed to 
the limitations inherent in human predictive capabilities, which in turn 
derive from the prohibitive costs associated with the process of acquir-
ing information about these events.  Foreseeability thus ensures that a 
defendant is expected neither to have perfect information nor to re-
main perfectly ignorant, but instead to be in possession of the amount 
of information that he is capable of possessing and is likely to use.111 
2.  Contract Law: Consequential Damages and Impossibility. — 
Contract law employs foreseeability in two unrelated contexts: conse-
quential damages and the doctrine of impossibility of performance.  Its 
basis for doing so remains the same in each context. 
Consequential damages are understood as damages for those losses 
that arise not directly from the party’s breach, but rather as an indi-
rect consequence of it.112  As a matter of rule, courts limit consequen-
tial damages to those losses that were capable of being “in the contem-
plation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it.”113  Consequential losses are thus 
recoverable only if they were foreseeable to both parties when the con-
tract was actually made.114 
The idea here is that unless a party is made aware of grounds for 
liability beyond direct losses, that party is unlikely to have bargained 
for such liability, and consequently, the consideration underlying the 
contract is unlikely to reflect the additional risk involved.  Since liabil-
ity in contract law is meant to be tied to the actual bargain — the ba-
sis of the contract — courts look to foreseeability at the time of the 
bargain.  Unless a contracting party was likely to have foreseen a con-
sequence, she is unlikely to have assumed the risk for it as part of the 
bargain. 
Additionally, contract law exempts one or both parties from per-
formance of the contract when an unanticipated supervening event 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 109 See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
TORT LAW 246–47 (1987); Grady, supra note 108, at 388; Steven Shavell, Liability and the Incen-
tive To Obtain Information About Risk, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 259 (1992). 
 110 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 109, at 247. 
 111 Grady, supra note 108, at 388–89.  
 112 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle of Hadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REV. 563, 
565 (1992). 
 113 Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854). 
 114 See Jeffrey M. Perloff, Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine of Hadley v. 
Baxendale, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 39 (1981). 
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renders performance impossible or commercially impracticable.115  
Courts here often employ the test of foreseeability to determine (objec-
tively) whether an event was capable of being anticipated in order to 
excuse nonperformance.116  The foreseeability test thus holds a party 
to “the terms of a contract unless her performance is rendered imprac-
ticable by an event that was unforeseeable at the time the contract was 
made.”117  The idea here is that it is unobjectionable to have parties 
incur losses (as a result of nonperformance) arising from consequences 
they ought to have foreseen and are therefore deemed to have been 
compensated for.118  Central to the idea is the proposition that unfore-
seeable risks are unlikely to have formed any part of the contractual 
bargain, whereas foreseeable ones are likely to have played such a role.  
Here, unsurprisingly, scholars have long tied the law’s use of foresee-
ability to its reliance on limited information processing by individuals 
under conditions of predictive uncertainty (that is, bounded rationality, 
in the organizational context).119  The law remains reluctant to allow 
recovery for eventualities and risks that parties are unlikely to have fo-
reseen when entering into a contract.120 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 115 For more on the doctrine and its development, see William Herbert Page, The Development 
of the Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance, 18 MICH. L. REV. 589 (1920); Michelle J. White, 
Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 353 (1988); John D. Wladis, Common Law and Uncommon Events: The Development of the 
Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance in English Contract Law, 75 GEO. L.J. 1575 (1987); and 
John D. Wladis, Impracticability As Risk Allocation: The Effect of Changed Circumstances upon 
Contract Obligations for the Sale of Goods, 22 GA. L. REV. 503 (1988). 
 116 See, e.g., Waldinger Corp. v. CRS Group Eng’rs, Inc., 775 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1985); Lloyd v. 
Murphy, 153 P.2d 47 (Cal. 1944); Farm Credit Bank of St. Louis v. Dorr, 620 N.E.2d 549, 555–56 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); City of Starkville v. 4-County Elec. Power Ass’n, 819 So.2d 1216, 1223 (Miss. 
2002); Alamance County Bd. of Educ. v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 306, 311 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Grady v. Grady, 504 A.2d 444, 447 (R.I. 1986); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, 
Disputes Over Omission in Contracts, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 860 (1968); Mary Sue Bloomfield, 
Comment, The Role of Foreseeability in Allocation of Risk Under U.C.C. 2-615, Excuse by Fail-
ure of Presupposed Conditions, 21 S. TEX. L.J. 441 (1981); Charles G. Brown, Note, The Doctrine 
of Impossibility of Performance and the Foreseeability Test, 6 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 575 (1975).  This 
test came to be codified in the Uniform Commercial Code.  See U.C.C. § 2-615 (2003). 
 117 John Elofson, The Dilemma of Changed Circumstances in Contract Law: An Economic 
Analysis of the Foreseeability and Superior Risk Bearer Tests, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 
4 (1996). 
 118 Id. 
 119 See Joskow, supra note 100, at 157 (“The foreseeability requirement may only make sense if 
we introduce the concept of ‘bounded rationality.’”); see also Shirley R. Brener, Comment, Out-
growing Impossibility: Examining the Impossibility Doctrine in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina, 
56 EMORY L.J. 461, 469, 477–80 (2006); Aaron J. Wright, Note, Rendered Impracticable: Behav-
ioral Economics and the Impracticability Doctrine, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2200 (2005). 
 120 See Joskow, supra note 100, at 157. 
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3.  Family Law: Premarital Agreements. — Courts often treat pre-
marital agreements very differently from other contracts.121  When it 
comes to enforcing them, courts routinely examine their actual content 
for substantive fairness.122  As part of this process they often use a fo-
reseeability test, which asks whether the situation upon divorce seems 
to be one that the parties could have anticipated when they entered in-
to the agreement.123  In situations where parties’ circumstances have 
changed since the agreement was entered into, courts remain reluctant 
to enforce the agreement.124 
In many ways the test operates in the exact same way as the doc-
trine of impossibility, except that foreseeability of the event is now a 
condition precedent to enforcement, rather than nonenforcement.  The 
driving idea is again that individuals make incomplete predictions — 
that is, that there exists a limit to the changes to their situations that 
parties are likely to have contemplated prior to their marriage.125 
4.  Property Law: Coming to the Nuisance. — Premised on the 
principle of temporal priority, the doctrine of coming to the nuisance is 
used to preclude nuisance actions by plaintiffs who move to a location 
where a defendant’s activities have been going on well before their 
move.126 
As part of this inquiry, to determine whether a plaintiff should 
have been aware of the defendant’s prior activities when moving, 
courts often use a test of foreseeability.  They ask if the injury being 
complained of was foreseeable to the plaintiff at the time of  
the move, and if answered in the affirmative, weigh this finding 
against the plaintiff.127  Even in situations where the defendant’s ac-
tions were subsequent to the plaintiff’s move, courts disallow the nui-
sance action when the defendant’s activities were unambiguously im-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 121 See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 1(1), 9C U.L.A. 39 (1983); 2 AL-
EXANDER LINDEY & LOUIS I. PARLEY, LINDEY AND PARLEY ON SEPARATION AGREE-
MENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 110.70(2)(d) (2d ed. 2002).  
 122 See Allison A. Marston, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 887, 897–901 (1997). 
 123 See Karen Servidea, Note, Reviewing Premarital Agreements To Protect the State’s Interest 
in Marriage, 91 VA. L. REV. 535, 545 (2005). 
 124 See, e.g., McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 267 (Minn. 1989); Gant v. Gant, 329 
S.E.2d 106, 115 (W. Va. 1985); Button v. Button, 388 N.W.2d 546, 552 (Wis. 1986).  
 125 See Servidea, supra note 123, at 547, 549 (referring to this approach as the “bounded-
rationality” approach). 
 126 For more on the doctrine, see Roy E. Cordato, Time Passage and the Economics of Coming 
to the Nuisance: Reassessing the Coasean Perspective, 20 CAMPBELL L. REV. 273 (1998); Rohan 
Pitchford & Christopher M. Snyder, Coming to the Nuisance: An Economic Analysis from an In-
complete Contracts Perspective, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 491 (2003); and Donald Wittman, First 
Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of “Coming to the Nuisance,” 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 557 
(1980). 
 127 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D (1979) (noting that the preexistence of 
the nuisance is but one of several factors to be considered, and not by itself a bar to relief). 
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minent — or, reasonably foreseeable.128  This often comes into play in 
situations where the precise nuisance complained of originated after 
the plaintiff’s move, but where the general category of activities (of 
which the defendant’s nuisance was but one) was known to be in the 
vicinity.129 
As with other areas of law discussed, the operating idea here is that 
reasonably foreseeable consequences ought to be part of an individ-
ual’s motives for action, while unforeseeable ones simply are not.  
Consequently, limiting liability for foreseeable nuisances is meant to 
create an ex ante effect on individuals’ moving decisions by forcing 
them to factor the possibility of such nuisances into their decisions. 
5.  Patent Law: Prosecution History Estoppel. — In patent law, the 
doctrine of equivalents allows courts in infringement actions to look 
beyond a patent’s exact claims and to enjoin as part of the patent’s ex-
clusivity “unimportant and insubstantial changes”130 that do nothing 
more than take a defendant’s actions outside the terms of a patent’s 
literal coverage.131  The rule of prosecution history estoppel in turn 
places a limit on a patentee’s use of the doctrine of equivalents.  It ap-
plies when a patentee surrenders or narrows a claim during the prose-
cution process.132  The rule then operates as a rule of abandonment, 
barring the patentee “from later invoking the doctrine of equivalents to 
recapture the lost ground.”133 
In determining how much a patentee surrenders each time a claim 
is modified, courts have recently come to use foreseeability to differen-
tiate between abandoned and unabandoned equivalents.134  As used 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 128 See Wittman, supra note 126, at 565.  The case of East St. John’s Shingle Co. v. City of 
Portland, 246 P.2d 554 (Or. 1952), is illustrative.  There, the plaintiff acquired a parcel of land 
adjoining a slough that was being polluted by the city’s sewage system.  After moving onto the 
land, the plaintiff complained that an increase in sewage levels in the slough was interfering with 
its business and causing a special nuisance to it.  The court concluded that since the pollution, its 
continuance, and its increase were all “reasonably foreseen” by the plaintiff, the claim was barred.  
Id. at 563–64.  
 129 See Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corp., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 233 (App. Div. 1932); Gau v. Ley, 
38 Ohio Ct. App. 235, 239 (1916); Wittman, supra note 126, at 565 n.20. 
 130 Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
 131 See id. at 607–08. 
 132 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 30–31 (1997). 
 133 Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 153 
(2004). 
 134 For early analyses of this trend, see Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent 
Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045 (2001); and Andrew C. Greenberg & Jeffrey R. Kuester, 
The “Palsgraffing” of Patent Law: Foreseeability and the Doctrine of Equivalents, INTELL. PROP. 
TODAY, June 1998, at 17.  See also Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim 
Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1970 (2005).  The 
test was adopted by the Supreme Court in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 
535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
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now, the rule allows patentees to use the doctrine of equivalents to 
claim equivalents that were unforeseeable to them when they nar-
rowed their claims, but not those that were foreseeable.135  The ration-
ale is that when a patentee could not have foreseen an equivalent, he is 
unlikely to have abandoned it, whereas a foreseeable equivalent may 
be deemed consciously abandoned unless expressly claimed.  Unfore-
seeable equivalents are thus unlikely to have been factored into the 
claim drafting process. 
B.  Foreseeability and Limits to Behavioral Modification 
In each of the areas discussed above, foreseeability performs a simi-
lar function.  Courts attempt to reconstruct actors’ decisionmaking at 
the time of the triggering event — that is, the event that triggers either 
the liability or the entitlement.  In so doing, courts use foreseeability, 
either directly or through the test of reasonable foreseeability, to elimi-
nate from the reconstruction certain low-probability outcomes that are 
unlikely to have formed a significant part of the decisionmaking proc-
ess.  As a functional matter, then, foreseeability limits the behavioral 
modification that the law expects to induce among actors. 
Additionally, foreseeability as used in these different areas of the 
law entails both a descriptive and a normative dimension.  Its descrip-
tive side derives from a belief about human behavior: that individuals 
do not ordinarily consider events and outcomes of low probability in 
making decisions.  Consequently, the law does not expect its system of 
incentives and deterrents to extend to these events and outcomes.  Its 
liability structure focuses exclusively on events likely to have formed 
part of an actor’s deliberations and thus capable of legitimate attribu-
tion to that actor during the cost-benefit allocation process.  In a sense, 
this descriptive dimension follows from the law’s concern with wind-
falls.  Allocating the costs and benefits arising from events that indi-
viduals were incapable of anticipating ex ante (and therefore avoiding 
and inducing, respectively) remains incongruent with the idea of ex 
post liability as a system of outcome responsibility.136  Thus, holding a 
defendant liable only for harms that objectively could have been an-
ticipated and deeming a patentee to have abandoned only variations of 
a patent’s claims during the drafting process that could have been pre-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 135 See Festo, 535 U.S. at 738; Lichtman, supra note 133, at 154; Richard Warburg et al., What 
Territory Is Surrendered?, 21 BIOTECH. L. REP. 551, 552 (2002). 
 136 Outcome responsibility argues that liability does no more than attribute legal responsibility 
for specific outcomes to identifiable individuals, as a reflection of the law’s basic commitment to 
human agency and moral authorship of individual actions.  See John Gardner, Obligations and 
Outcomes in the Law of Torts, in RELATING TO RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS FOR TONY 
HONORÉ ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 111 (Peter Cane & John Gardner eds., 2001); Tony 
Honoré, Responsibility and Luck, 104 LAW Q. REV. 530 (1988). 
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dicted both derive from a common belief that the attribution of out-
comes to individuals should conform to the way in which individuals 
ordinarily perceive the world.137 
Foreseeability’s normative side, on the other hand, relates to the 
law’s forward-looking (or ex ante) function.  Here, foreseeability tem-
pers the law’s model of inducements for future actors by making an 
entitlement or liability contingent on something being either foresee-
able or unforeseeable.  It thus encourages actors to acquire, disclose, or 
limit their information gathering by reference to the foreseeability lim-
it.  The descriptive and normative aspects almost always go together, 
for the latter derives from the former.  Nonetheless, bifurcating the 
two helps shed light on the interaction between foreseeability and the 
law’s incentive structure in each setting. 
Foreseeability thus attempts to balance the law’s ex ante and ex 
post effects.  Certain low-probability outcomes are thought incapable 
of playing a significant role in inducing ex ante behavior; when allocat-
ing the costs or benefits associated with them one way or the other is 
thought to produce inefficiencies ex post, foreseeability allows courts to 
disregard them during the calculus.  The table that follows attempts to 
separate the descriptive and normative roles that foreseeability plays 
in each of the contexts discussed in section A.  What it shows is that in 
each setting foreseeability shapes the law’s liability or attribution 
structure, and at the same time influences individual behavior to con-
form to the law. 
Thus, in different areas of the common law, foreseeability ably in-
stantiates the idea that individuals have limited predictive capabilities 
that in turn influence their decisionmaking.  It does so in recognition 
of the law’s objective of influencing future behavior among actors and 
eliminating socially inefficient windfall gains and losses. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 137 Professor Stephen Perry, a well-known proponent of outcome responsibility, connects this to 
the idea of “avoidability” — that liability should be limited to events and outcomes that might in a 
sense be considered avoidable ex ante.  Avoidability, for Perry, involves an agent having the “abil-
ity and opportunity to take steps” to avoid the harm “on the basis of what could have been fore-
seen.”  Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSO-
PHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 91 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001).  Foreseeability thus plays a 
major role here, based on the notion of “epistemic probability” — or the idea that individuals base 
their decisions not on objective assessments of probability, but rather on intersubjective standards 
of inductive reasoning.  Id. at 97–98.  To impose liability for (that is, to have people internalize the 
costs or benefits of) events that were not objectively avoidable then becomes a matter of chance, 
or a windfall, since it bears no connection to the actor’s actual behavior. 
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TABLE 1.  FORESEEABILITY AS A DESCRIPTIVE  
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IV.  FORESEEABILITY IN COPYRIGHT LAW 
What might copyright law look like if a test of foreseeability were 
introduced into its infringement inquiry as a mechanism by which to 
eliminate any unincentivized benefits (that is, windfalls), thereby bal-
ancing the system’s ex ante incentive effects against its ex post social 
costs?  This Part attempts to answer that question by proposing a new 
test of “foreseeable copying” that would require a plaintiff to establish 
that the defendant’s copying was objectively foreseeable at the time of 
creation — the point at which copyright’s incentive structure is meant 
to have influenced a creator’s behavior.  It would thus place the bur-
den on a plaintiff to establish, in addition to actual copying and sub-
stantial similarity, that the defendant’s copying was of a form and for a 
purpose foreseeable to a reasonable, informed creator at the time when 
the work was created.  The test would thus operate as part of the enti-
tlement delineation process, rather than as an exception to it (unlike 
fair use), thereby forcing courts to structure copyright’s grant of exclu-
sivity by reference to the outer bounds of a creator’s incentive.  Thus, 
in situations where a defendant’s form of copying (or use) was not 
known, in existence, or capable of being anticipated at the time the 
work was created, the test would limit a plaintiff’s claim by acknowl-
edging that the creator’s control over this new use (or copying) could 
not have formed a necessary part of the creator’s set of incentives in 
creating it.  This Part outlines in greater detail the shape this test 
might take. 
A.  The Foreseeability Limit 
If the law is willing to assume in other areas that unforeseeable 
events are not motivational concerns, it would seem inconsistent with 
this basic premise to have a system of copyright that assumes other-
wise.  Unforeseeable uses are unlikely to be part of a creator’s induce-
ment to create in exactly the same way that unforeseeable conse-
quences are unlikely to be part of an individual’s decision whether to 
act.  A test of “foreseeable copying” would operationalize this idea. 
In the abstract, foreseeability may appear to be an unworkable idea 
— one that is likely to either prove indeterminate in practice or inter-
fere significantly with creators’ incentives.  Gordon, one of the earliest 
to consider its applicability to copyright, rejects it as a useful device in 
copyright law, observing that it is likely to present “intractable proof 
problems” and “dilute economic incentives.”138  This treatment ignores 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 138 Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary 
Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 238 & n.337 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning Information].  
Gordon does not specify what foreseeability might indeed come to mean in the copyright context 
(specifically given its use elsewhere) and seems to equate foreseeability with the idea of “expected 
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altogether the nuance with which foreseeability has come to be rou-
tinely used as an objective indicator in a host of other areas, and more 
importantly, the basic idea underlying its use in different contexts: the 
existence of an outer limit to any expected behavioral modification. 
1.  Copyright’s Theory of Foreseeability: “Foreseeable Copying.” — 
Under the current law, copyright protection begins the moment a work 
is created, with creation being defined as the point when a work, eligi-
ble for protection, is fixed in a tangible medium for the first time.139  
Protection is automatic, with there being no obligation on the creator 
to comply with any formalities as a prerequisite for protection.  The 
law grants the creator a finite set of exclusive rights in relation to the 
work and allows the creator to initiate an action for infringement 
when someone interferes with one of those rights.140 
When the creator (plaintiff) commences an action for infringement 
against a defendant, the law places the burden on the plaintiff to es-
tablish two main elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) 
copying by the defendant of the original (that is, protected) ele-
ments.141  To establish ownership, the plaintiff usually has to establish 
that the work is entitled to protection per the statutory requirements 
and that he is the valid owner of the rights in it.142  However, the law 
requires that the work be registered with the Copyright Office before 
an action for infringement is brought, and this registration serves as 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
markets,” thereby converting it into a subjective test, specific to individual creators.  Gordon, su-
pra note 14, at 1385 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 1385 nn.192–93; Gordon, 
On Owning Information, supra, at 238 n.337.  She does note, however, that the idea is “perhaps 
desirable in the abstract” since new markets might be irrelevant to creative incentives.  Id. at 238.  
Interestingly, Gordon recognizes in her later work that the idea of foreseeability as used in tort 
law does represent an outer limit to incentives.  However, she argues that copyright’s limited term 
gives effect to this limit independently, seemingly obviating the need for its independent incorpo-
ration into copyright doctrine.  See Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright As Tort Law’s Mirror Image: 
“Harms,” “Benefits,” and the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533, 538–39 
(2003).  
  In a similar vein, Landes and Posner note that eliminating “unforeseen” markets from the 
copyright entitlement is likely to dampen creator incentives since an incentive ordinarily extends 
to a “class of markets.”  William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copy-
right, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 471, 476 n.14 (2003).  It would appear that an objective (as opposed to 
subjective) foreseeability test would function precisely in this manner, allowing a creator to cap-
ture not just present markets, but also those cognately related to them.  See Shyamkrishna Balga-
nesh, Rethinking Copyright: Property Through the Lenses of Unjust Enrichment and Unfair Com-
petition, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 345, 349–50 & n.23 (2008), http://www.pennumbra. 
com/responses/01-2008/Balganesh.pdf; see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foresee-
ability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969, 973–74 (2007) (using the idea indirectly in argu-
ing that the fair use analysis should focus on the occurrence or absence of “copyright harm” to the 
plaintiff). 
 139 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 140 Id. §§ 106, 501. 
 141 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.01, at 13-4 to -5.  
 142 See id. § 13.01[A], at 13-6 to -7.  
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prima facie evidence of ownership and satisfaction of the statutory 
prerequisites for protection.143  Consequently, during infringement ac-
tions courts focus on the second of the two elements: copying. 
Since the question of copying is not entirely factual, a plaintiff 
needs to convince a court not just that the defendant appropriated 
part of his work, but also that the portion appropriated is protectible 
as such.144  This is done using the substantial similarity requirement, 
discussed previously.  After this, the requirement of foreseeability 
would have courts go one step further and require the plaintiff to show 
not just factual and wrongful copying, but additionally foreseeable 
copying. 
Foreseeability would thus operate as a third element in the deter-
mination of copying.  The requirement of “foreseeable copying” would 
ask whether the defendant’s use (that is, copying) of the protected work 
was foreseeable to the plaintiff — in form and purpose — when the 
work was created.  It is critical to note that the question posed is one of 
foreseeability and not foresight.  It is not relevant whether the plaintiff 
actually foresaw the defendant’s form of copying; it only matters that 
the copying was foreseeable, in light of the information available to 
him at the stage of creation.  In addition, by focusing the inquiry on 
the point of creation (and not after), it minimizes the effect of hindsight 
bias on the inquiry.145 
It is worth emphasizing that the foreseeability here relates to the 
form and purpose of the defendant’s copying and not to other factors, 
such as its magnitude or monetary consequences.  In some ways this 
aspect of the test would track tort law’s rule on “eggshell skull” plain-
tiffs, where a defendant is not allowed to argue that the magnitude or 
extent of the harm or loss suffered by the plaintiff was not foreseeable 
because it depended on attributes specific to the plaintiff, such as a 
preexistent medical condition.146  Thus, if harm was a foreseeable con-
sequence of the defendant’s actions, it matters little that the plaintiff 
was an ailing old woman, rather than a teenager in perfect health.  In 
a similar vein, it should matter little to the foreseeability determination 
that the defendant copied the entire book, or made a million copies of 




 143 17 U.S.C. §§ 410(c), 411. 
 144 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.01[B], at 13-8 to -9. 
 145 Hindsight bias is a phenomenon that many scholars argue influences the infringement ques-
tion in all of intellectual property law.  See infra section V.D., pp. 1630–32. 
 146 See Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1994); Vosberg v. Putney, 47 N.W. 99 (Wis. 
1890). 
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In this formulation, foreseeability would focus on the defendant’s 
actions (that is, the copying), rather than function as an open-ended 
device that courts might then connect to the notions of “harm” or 
“market.”  Any reliance on these ideas as independent concepts, even 
when prefaced by the question of foreseeability (that is, as “foreseeable 
harm” or “foreseeable market”), will inevitably depend on a set of first-
order assumptions that need to be justified on their own.147  Questions 
of appropriate baselines, market substitutability, remoteness, and the 
like enter the equation as independent variables with the result that 
the inquiry begins to focus less on the creator’s incentive at the time of 
creation and more on these other elements.148  “Foreseeable copying,” 
on the other hand, obviates any reliance on first-order assumptions 
and connects foreseeability as a behavioral device with the act of copy-
ing that is always at the core of an infringement dispute. 
Given that copying in one form or another is central to every action 
for infringement, the test of foreseeability would operate regardless of 
which exclusive right the plaintiff alleges the defendant to have in-
fringed.  Thus, in most situations where substantial similarity is easily 
satisfied, the foreseeability test would be, too.  But in situations where 
the defendant’s copying is a consequence of an innovative use that 
does not owe its existence to the creator, foreseeability begins to play a 
significant role.  Thus, uses such as the Google Library Project149 that 
employ prior works in a new way are likely to satisfy the substantial 
similarity test; whether they constitute copying would then depend on 
the plaintiff’s ability to establish that the use was within the realm of 
foreseeable uses when the work was created.  The same would be the 
case for uses involving new media such as cable television, home re-
cording, or the digitization of music. 
Under current doctrine, questions of this nature are relegated to the 
fair use inquiry.  Given that fair use is an affirmative defense, the bur-
den then falls to the defendant to show how his actions (of copying) 
were not harmful to the plaintiff.150  It places the entire focus on the 
defendant, glossing over the uses that the plaintiff might have legiti-
mately expected to control in creating the work.  Foreseeable copying 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 147 See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 138, at 1003 (attempting to understand copyright harm as 
“foreseeable harm”).  Professor Christina Bohannan seems to implicitly connect the idea to infer-
ences of market substitutability.  As a consequence, foreseeability ceases to function as an inde-
pendent behavioral limit, since unforeseeable uses in her model could still form part of the enti-
tlement upon an independent showing of substitution.  See id. at 989. 
 148 For a useful discussion of some of these ideas as applied to copyright, see Wendy J. Gordon, 
Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449 
(1992). 
 149 See Band, supra note 66, at 6. 
 150 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 12.11[F]. 
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shifts the burden onto the plaintiff to establish this point as part of the 
infringement inquiry. 
Foreseeable copying would thus function as an objective proxy for 
a creator’s anticipated markets.  Yet it relies on copyright’s bipolar 
(that is, private law) structure as a pivot around which to construct 
those markets.  It would in a sense function analogously to antitrust 
law’s “relevant market” determination, where courts attempt to con-
struct the outer bounds of a notional market for a good or service in 
order to assess an entity’s influence therein.151  The process there is 
both factual and normative, with the determination often expressly in-
formed by antitrust law’s goals and objectives.152  In a similar vein, 
foreseeable copying would have courts undertake a nearly identical re-
construction of the notional market, but now by reference to copy-
right’s purpose: inducing creativity.  It would draw attention to the 
centrality of identifying a probability distribution of future markets at 
the time of creation, in order to eliminate those that were unlikely to 
have formed a necessary part of a creator’s set of future markets that 
together constituted the incentive. 
The elements of form and purpose that make up the test in turn 
connect to two central determinants of future market structure in the 
copyright context: technology and use.  One could thus posit four pos-
sible configurations based on these indicators.  In the first, both use 
and technology are foreseeable; in the second, neither is; in the third, 
use is foreseeable while technology is not; and finally in the fourth, 
vice versa.  The first situation represents those markets that were 
clearly within a creator’s objectively anticipated revenue streams for 
the work.  The second, by contrast, represents markets that are truly 
stochastic and therefore incapable of being anticipated in any sense.  
In the third and fourth configurations, however, the interaction be-
tween form and purpose (that is, technology and use) becomes crucial.  
Where a change in either form or purpose is independently significant 
enough that it impacts the other (that is, purpose or form, respectively) 
so as to alter the structure of the market, one might posit that the 
market as a whole was unforeseeable.  Yet in other situations where 
the unforeseeability is solely either of use or technology and is self-
contained, the market might be classified as foreseeable.153  For exam-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 151 See generally Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Inte-
grated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1984); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market 
Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981). 
 152 See Harris & Jorde, supra note 151, at 18–19. 
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ple, the mere transition to a newer, more efficient technology (for ex-
ample, Blu-ray from DVDs) would fit the latter category, for the tech-
nology may have been unforeseeable yet it is likely to have little im-
pact on the structure of the market and the use to which the creative 
work is put.  By contrast, the move from broadcast television to VCRs, 
though principally a technological development, reoriented the market 
and uses therein — through the idea of time-shiftable home viewership 
— and would, under the test, come out as unforeseeable. 
The distinction between these last two situations is particularly im-
portant because it allows the test to be mapped onto a concern often 
voiced in the copyright context — namely, that of market substitution.  
If a new technology (and the market it creates) has the effect of replac-
ing the demand for the creative work in existent markets, should not 
that harm be accounted for by the copyright system?  While harm 
from substitution certainly is not copyright’s core concern, to the ex-
tent that it is likely to impact a creator’s ex ante incentive (that is, 
where a substitute was foreseeable), it certainly ought to remain a re-
levant consideration.  Foreseeable copying, through its use of form and 
purpose as indicators, allows for this by differentiating between mar-
kets that are primarily a result of demand diversion and those that 
arise largely out of the creation of new demand.154  The latter includes 
markets dependent largely on consumers who were not previously 
buying the work, while the former includes markets that rely on di-
verting customers away from existent markets.155  Future markets that 
are structurally different in form and purpose from existent ones — 
that is, markets for unforeseeable uses — are likely to derive largely 















Scenario 3  
(U, F) 
Scenario 2  
(U, U) 
  
It is also perhaps worth mentioning that situations in Scenario 4 typically are also the subject of 
the transformative use defense under current fair use law.  See supra pp. 1585–86.  The foresee-
able copying test would not replace transformative use, but would posit a preliminary question: 
whether the creator’s entitlement extends to the market for the transformation to begin with (in 
simple terms, a question of whether the specific market for that transformation was foreseeable).  
Only if the question is answered in the affirmative would the foreseeable copying test allow the 
transformative use defense to proceed to a social welfare analysis to decide whether to find the 
existence of infringement or exempt the action as independently creative.  Thanks to Adam 
Badawi and Arden Rowell for discussions that resulted in this table. 
 154 Harm from market substitution derives largely (if not entirely) from demand diversion, 
making this distinction very relevant.  See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differen-
tiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 272 (2004) (noting the connection between the two). 
 155 Id. at 260. 
 
2009] COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES 1609 
tent demand, thereby allowing the concern with substitutability to be 
given some salience in the entitlement structuring process.  To give the 
concern with substitutability any more significance than this (for ex-
ample, by attempting to control for all substitutes, not just foreseeable 
ones) would collapse the system back into its current state, devoid of 
any connection to incentives and the probability distribution that is 
central to them. 
2.  Working Foreseeable Copying. — Does the theory of foreseeabil-
ity, as contained in the “foreseeable copying” test, actually present 
courts with a workable basis on which to construe copyright’s grant of 
exclusivity?  In other words, is it likely to complicate copyright law by 
introducing an altogether new conceptual device, the use of which 
would entail additional costs? 
Interestingly enough, the idea of foreseeability is not completely 
alien to copyright law and its treatment of new uses.  It remains 
somewhat common for courts to use the idea in construing the scope of 
rights granted by a licensor to the licensee under a license for the 
work.156  Its use in that context is likely to provide courts with a di-
rectly relevant way in which to operationalize the test, making the 
transition to the new approach much simpler than one might imagine. 
Foreseeability in the licensing context can be traced back to Judge 
Friendly, whose opinion in Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.157 
used foreseeability to determine whether an assignment of motion pic-
ture rights included the right to telecast a copyrighted work.  Observ-
ing that knowledgeable people knew of television’s potential at the 
time that the license was entered into, the court concluded that the li-
censor had “reason to know” of the new technology and was therefore 
deemed to have included it in the grant.158  In Bartsch, the district 
court had relied on expert testimony to the effect that “[t]he processes 
of theatre and home television exhibition [were] markedly similar”159 
from both commercial and technical perspectives in the industry when 
the contract was entered into — thirty-seven years prior to the actual 
litigation.160  The Second Circuit endorsed this approach to construing 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 156 See Sidney A. Rosenzweig, Comment, Don’t Put My Article Online!: Extending Copyright’s 
New-Use Doctrine to the Electronic Publishing Media and Beyond, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 915 
(1995) (“In determining whether the new technology falls within the scope of the explicitly granted 
or preexisting technology, courts examine the foreseeability of the new medium.”). 
 157 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).  For a more recent application of the doctrine, see Boosey & 
Hawkes Music Publishers, Ltd. v. Walt Disney Co., 145 F.3d 481, 486 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 158 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154 (finding that the law “will not charge a grantor with the duty of 
expressly saving [some] rights when he could not know of the invention’s existence” and finding 
“no case holding that an experienced businessman” is “not bound by the natural implications of 
the language he accepted when he had reason to know of the new medium’s potential”).  
 159 Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 896, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
 160 Id. at 900–01. 
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the license, concluding that the work’s use in the context of a telecast 
was therefore plainly foreseeable.161  As a seemingly natural corollary, 
in situations where the technology or use in question was not publicly 
known at the time that the license was entered into, or where circum-
stances imply that there exists no reasonable basis on which to impute 
knowledge of the same to the licensor at the time of the licensing, 
courts construe the grant narrowly to exclude the new use in dispute 
from its scope.162 
The logic for this attempt to limit the grant resonates with foresee-
ability’s use as a bounded rationality–driven device.  Thus, one court 
noted that a new use may need to be excluded from the contractual 
grant when it “was completely unforeseeable and therefore could not 
possibly have formed part of the bargain between the parties at the 
time of the original grant.”163  Since contract law is concerned with 
linking liability for breach with parties’ intent in entering into the con-
tract, factors and possibilities that could not have possibly formed part 
of this intent are excluded, and liability is correspondingly limited.  As 
a matter of contract law, this approach appears reasonable and per-
fectly logical, given contract law’s focus on the parties’ “bargain.”164 
All the same, the approach is also often justified in noncontractual 
terms as deriving from the need to avoid giving one party an unjusti-
fied windfall.  In explaining this rationale, one court has noted that the 
foreseeability test prevents the licensee from reaping “the entire wind-
fall” associated with the unforeseen use.165  Allowing a licensee to ben-
efit from exogenous technological developments that were not part of 
the bargain is deemed a windfall and perhaps rightly so.  But why 
then is not the licensor’s (that is, creator’s) benefiting from similar ex-
ogenous developments a windfall too?  In other words, why should the 
unforeseeable use not remain outside the reach of the original copy-
right grant to begin with? 
Foreseeability is thus used to limit a licensee’s copyright grant but 
not the licensor’s original one, which remains somewhat of an anomaly 
— especially given that over the years courts have developed tools by 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 161 Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 154. 
 162 For different approaches to this corollary, see, for example, Rey v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 
1388 (1st Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988);  
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Westminster Music, Ltd., 838 F. Supp. 153, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Platinum 
Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd., 566 F. Supp. 226, 227 (D.N.J. 1983); and Kirke La Shelle Co. v. 
Paul Armstrong Co., 188 N.E. 163, 165–66 (N.Y. 1933). 
 163 Rey, 990 F.2d at 1388 (citing Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854; Kirke La Shelle Co., 188 N.E. at 163). 
 164 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 
(1982); cf. Rosenzweig, supra note 156, at 917 (noting that the open-ended nature of the analysis 
allows courts to “manipulate” the determination). 
 165 Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854 (quoting Neil R. Nagano, Comment, Past Copyright Licenses and 
the New Video Software Medium, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1160, 1184 (1982)) (internal quotation mark 
omitted). 
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which to answer the retrospective inquiry in the contractual context.  
They look to popular media, trade journals, expert testimony, industry 
practice, and at times, simple logic to assess the foreseeability of a spe-
cific use.  Each of these mechanisms is capable of direct application in 
construing copyright’s original grant of exclusivity during the in-
fringement inquiry as well.  Perhaps more importantly, though, they 
map rather well onto the form and purpose indicators that are central 
to the foreseeable copying test. 
In addition, the bipolarity of copyright disputes is likely to ensure 
that, in the infringement context, parties will advance opposing con-
structions of foreseeability in much the same way as they do in the 
contractual setting.  Thus, in the contractual setting, there are three 
parties in the overall scheme of things: (1) the original grantor of 
rights, the state; (2) the original grantee, who is also the contractual 
grantor (the licensor); and (3) the contractual grantee, the licensee. 
When a court is called upon to interpret the scope of an assign-
ment, the dispute is between the author in his capacity as contractual 
grantor and the licensee, as contractual grantee.  Courts use foresee-
ability as an objective proxy for parties’ intentions, to determine 
whether or not the disputed use was part of the assignment.  What is 
critical, however, is that both parties to the dispute have opposing in-
terests in interpreting the grant.  The grantor prefers a narrow con-
struction (to limit the assignment), while the grantee naturally prefers 
a broader one. 
In an infringement action, by contrast, the author as original gran-
tee would now prefer an expansive construction of the grant, while the 
original grantor, the state, would not be a party to the proceeding.  In 
the state’s place would be the defendant, whose interests, interestingly 
enough, track those of the contractual grantor in the bilateral setting.  
The defendant’s interest would thus be to narrow the grant, and 
thereby minimize or avoid liability for infringement.  Thus, the ab-
sence of a grantor seeking a narrow construction of the grant is ac-
counted for by the presence of the defendant.  Given the bipolar set-
ting within which the entitlement and its scope are determined, it 
replicates the exact same process and interests that are at play in the 
contractual one. 
It is worth emphasizing that even though it may appear as if the 
foreseeability inquiry is one of subjective intent — that is, whether one 
or both parties actually expected the grant to cover a use — in reality, 
the determination is always objective.166  Since parties’ intentions on 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 166 Indeed, much of contract law has concerned itself with the move from a model of subjective 
intention to one of objective intention, which some view as in itself problematic and detracting 
from contract law’s avowed emphasis on the ideas of consent and party autonomy.  For more on 
objective intention in construing contractual terms, see LARRY A. DIMATTEO, CONTRACT 
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the issue are not readily apparent from the terms of the contract, 
courts impute foresight (or the lack thereof) to parties based on exter-
nal circumstantial evidence.  The test is thus entirely objective and has 
little to do with parties’ actual intentions.  Consequently, the mere fact 
that, unlike in the contract setting, one of the parties (the state, the 
original grantor) is not present and able to advance a construction of 
its actual intent is completely irrelevant.  The bipolar nature of the 
dispute before the court ensures that opposing constructions of the 
grant are advanced in both contexts, even when either grantor or 
grantee is not a party to the proceedings before the court. 
Foreseeability as a limiting basis, then, is perfectly well known in 
the world of copyright.  Expanding it beyond its current use in the bi-
lateral context, to construing copyright’s original grant of exclusivity 
as well, is likely to face few conceptual hurdles. 
3.  Mirroring Nonobviousness. — The foreseeable copying test re-
quires a court to go back in time to the year in which the work was 
created (and copyright attached to it) in order to determine whether 
the defendant’s present use was capable of being anticipated then.  In 
many ways, its retrospective nature mirrors patent law’s requirement 
of nonobviousness.  The law requires courts to invalidate a patent if 
the subject matter of the invention would have been obvious to a “per-
son having ordinary skill in the art” (that is, the PHOSITA) “at the 
time the invention was made.”167  To determine whether inventions 
were nonobvious, courts are thus required to put themselves not just 
in the shoes of potential inventors, but to base their finding on inven-
tors’ likely awareness at the time of the invention.168  In constructing 
the entitlement — that is, the patent — courts thus go back in time to 
assess what should have been known to the inventor when the inven-
tion was made and thereupon validate the invention only if it was not 
obvious then. 
Foreseeable copying would have courts do just the opposite.  The 
test asks courts to determine whether the defendant’s present use 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
THEORY: THE EVOLUTION OF CONTRACTUAL INTENT (1998); LON L. FULLER & MELVIN 
ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 743–46 (7th ed. 2001); Larry A. DiMatteo, The 
Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 
S.C. L. REV. 293 (1997); and Nancy Kim, Mistakes, Changed Circumstances and Intent, 56 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 473 (2008).  
 167 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).  For more on the PHOSITA standard, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 885 (2004). 
 168 See In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting the importance of relying on 
“then-accepted wisdom in the field” in making the determination); In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 
999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting the importance of “casting the mind back to the time of invention”); 
Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasizing the im-
portance of focusing the decisionmaker’s mind on what would have been obvious “when the in-
vention was made”). 
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should have been “obvious” to the creator (the plaintiff) at the time of 
the creation, not to constrict the entitlement, but rather to expand it.  
Courts, in working the test, might thus adopt an equivalent of the 
PHOSITA standard that is calibrated to the world of creators.  Such a 
standard would presume creators are, at a minimum, informed — in 
the sense that the creator knows of the different mediums in existence 
in which the work can be employed — and rational — in that the 
creator intends to either directly or indirectly control the markets for 
those different mediums. 
* * * 
Based on this discussion, consider the following hypotheticals: 
Example 1: K, a composer, creates a musical work in the year 1955.  
At the time, television and broadcast technology are well known, as is 
the process of using music for motion pictures.  All the same, the 
videocassette recorder (VCR) has not been developed yet.  In 1985, a 
few years after VCRs become commercially available, S makes a copy 
of K’s work on a VHS tape when it airs on television.  In addition, P, 
a producer, uses the work in a television broadcast without a license.  
These uses implicate K’s exclusive right to reproduce the work.  As-
sume that in 1990, K were to commence an action for copyright in-
fringement against P and S.  Under the proposed requirement of fore-
seeability, the onus would be on K to establish that both P’s and S’s 
uses of the work constitute forms of “foreseeable copying” — uses that 
were foreseeable in 1955, that is, when K created the work.  K would 
have little problem doing this in relation to P’s actions, given that 
television broadcasts were well known in 1955, but vis-à-vis S his case 
would be more difficult, since VCRs were neither known nor invented 
in 1955.169  A court is thus likely to conclude that since video record- 
ing is “markedly different” from mere television viewing, the use of  
the work therein was not foreseeable and S’s use is not foreseeable 
copying.170 
Example 2: C, a software developer, creates a short software pro-
gram to diagnose system errors.  N comes along and, finding the code 
employed to be aesthetically pleasing, begins using large parts of it on 
a line of bed linen that he begins to market.  N’s use is likely to impli-
cate C’s exclusive rights to reproduce and (perhaps) adapt the work.  
Here, foreseeable copying would place the burden on C to establish 
that N’s use of his literary work as part of a new line of bed linen was 
foreseeable (even if as a derivative work) at the time of creation.  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 169 The hypothetical here tracks the facts of a well-known licensing dispute, in which the ques-
tion was whether the grant of television rights covered the right to distribute the content on vid-
eocassettes.  The court, using a foreseeability standard, answered the question in the negative.  
Cohen, 845 F.2d at 851. 
 170 See id. at 854. 
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While the inquiry does not assume the question to be answered one 
way or the other, a court is perhaps more likely than not to find 
against C on the issue of foreseeability.171 
Example 3: JK, an author, writes a bestselling work of fiction in 
the year 1970, at which time motion picture and related technologies 
are well known.  In 1997, W produces a motion picture based entirely 
on JK’s novel, and in 1998 G develops a computer video game based 
on the novel.  Both W’s and G’s actions implicate JK’s exclusive adap-
tation right.  Here, however, the outcomes are likely to be different.  
Since motion picture technology and the use of literary works as story-
lines therein might have been well-established practices (and the mar-
ket for them objectively anticipatable) when JK created the work, a 
court is likely to conclude that W’s use was indeed foreseeable.  As for 
G, however, the market for video gaming and the technology on which 
it relies were neither in existence nor anticipated in 1970, and a court 
is likely to conclude that G’s actions were unforeseeable in form and 
purpose. 
JK’s case serves to highlight an important point.  Merely because a 
defendant’s use is different from the creator’s does not mean that it au-
tomatically comes to be exempted from liability.  Not all new uses are 
unforeseeable.  Where new uses are indeed foreseeable, as in the case 
of traditional derivatives, the foreseeability test is likely to come out in 
favor of the plaintiff, with few exceptions.  The reason for this is sim-
ple: the possibility of a movie adaptation might have formed some part 
of JK’s incentive in creating the work. 
B.  Compatibility: Foreseeability and Copyright’s  
Incentive Structure 
A test of foreseeability is likely to limit a creator’s control over the 
uses to which his creation may be put.  Specifically, it would eliminate 
those uses that are objectively unforeseeable at the time of creation 
from the scope of the entitlement.  What effect, if any, is this likely to 
have on creators’ ex ante incentives to create?  Is knowing that they 
are unlikely to be able to control unanticipated uses of their work 
likely to affect their inducement to create the work to begin with?  Al-
ternatively, will it impact their incentive to distribute the work? 
This section argues that a foreseeability-based limit is perfectly 
compatible with copyright’s basic structure as an incentive.  Specifi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 171 A secondary, yet important, question relates to the defendant’s — that is, N’s — own crea-
tivity and the way in which the copyright system needs to evaluate that as part of the process.  
Once foreseeable copying works to delineate a creator’s incentive-driven markets, the analysis of 
whether the social utility from N’s creation is enough reason to generate an exception, in light of 
the costs and benefits of giving a creator control over it, is best accomplished by the traditional 
fair use analysis. 
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cally, it looks to how foreseeability might interact with two prominent 
ways in which incentives are often modeled in the copyright context.  
The first is the tendency to equate the idea of incentives with creators’ 
optimistic expectations, even when devoid of any objective basis.  The 
second derives from the “prospect theory,” which is used to justify pat-
ent law’s grant of an early, tailored monopoly to an inventor once a 
minimal threshold of inventiveness is crossed, in the belief that this is 
likely to incentivize additional investment into the invention. 
1.  Open-ended Expectations. — Given the development of techno-
logical media over the last several decades and the incremental exten-
sion of copyright terms by Congress that has followed, one might ar-
gue that creators today rightfully expect such developments to occur, 
and are indeed driven (that is, incentivized) by the expectation.172  If 
they tend to factor these expectations into their ex ante creative deci-
sionmaking, why should copyright now vindicate them ex post? 
To begin with, it is worth noting that these open-ended expecta-
tions differ from the paradigmatic incentive.  Unlike incentives that 
are grounded in ascertainable market indicators, expectations rely al-
most entirely on predictions that derive from events in the past that 
have no independent reason to repeat themselves in the future.  Thus, 
a creator’s expectation in creating a work today, hoping that at some 
time in the future Congress is likely to retroactively extend the copy-
right term simply because it has done so before, is markedly different 
from her incentive in creating the work: attempting to satisfy an iden-
tifiable demand for works of that nature and generating profits from 
the process.  Similarly, a creator’s belief that her work will come to be 
used in association with some wholly unforeseeable medium, merely 
because such unforeseeable media emerged in the past, represents an 
expectation that is not necessarily grounded in anything other than a 
bald prediction that a historical contingency is likely to repeat itself.173  
It is not readily apparent that copyright needs to validate every ex ante 
estimate or expectation of a creator. 
Yet, one might still want such expectations to form some part of 
copyright’s incentive structure, in the same way as a lottery with fluc-
tuating odds does in the end provide individuals with an incentive of 
some kind.  Indeed, current policy tends to favor their inclusion.  As 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 172 Indeed, the Supreme Court seems to have adopted precisely such an argument in its valida-
tion of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 215 
(2003).  The Court there recognized the possibility of future term extensions forming a part of 
copyright’s incentive structure.  In addition, the Court referred to Congress’s “consistent historical 
practice” of extending copyright’s term and applying the extension retroactively.  Id. at 204.   
 173 To the extent that it is indeed grounded in an awareness of the industry in question and 
technological developments therein, it is likely to be characterized as foreseeable under the stan-
dard and test described earlier.  The discussion here, therefore, is restricted to predictions and ex-
pectations that are not grounded in such an awareness. 
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Professor Sara Stadler notes, courts and legislators are often driven by 
creators’ “expectations” (determined ex post) in constructing copy-
right’s actual incentive, creating a cycle that results in the outward ex-
pansion of copyright’s exclusive rights regime.174  The process of de-
termining the incentive is then indirectly delegated to creators — who 
equate their open-ended expectations with their incentives — resulting 
in anything short of perfect control being viewed as less than opti-
mal.175  A large part of this problem derives from the obvious use of 
hindsight to reconstruct the ex ante incentive.  Having brought the 
work into existence, creators argue that they would not have done so 
had they known that their open-ended expectations would not be real-
ized, causing courts and policymakers to impute this ex post realiza-
tion into their ex ante decisionmaking. 
Leaving aside the question of whether this expectation should at all 
be a part of copyright’s incentive structure if indeed we remain con-
cerned with a satisfactory (as opposed to optimal or maximal) incen-
tive, the question that persists is whether the test of foreseeable copy-
ing is likely to interfere directly with or diminish that expectation.  
Here, the fact that the test is structured as an uncertain standard ra-
ther than as a bright-line rule is likely to make a major difference.176 
Unlike rules, standards are characterized by their relegating the 
process of giving content to the law and its application to a point in 
time after an action has taken place, that is, ex post.177  Rules are gen-
erally more costly to create upfront (given the precision they involve), 
while standards transfer those costs to the adjudicative process.178  
Viewed ex ante, then, standards tend to be somewhat indeterminate (or 
fuzzy), characterized by the uncertainty of their applicability to a spe-
cific context.  This uncertainty, though, is responsible for minimizing 
the law’s impact on creative decisionmaking. 
Intellectual property laws — patent and copyright in specific — 
contain innumerable vague standards.179  In many ways this is largely 
beneficial.  Standards enable courts to calibrate the scope of the enti-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 174 Stadler, supra note 30, at 454–56.  For a slightly different argument on how expectations 
influence risk aversion, thereby feeding back into the scope of the rights granted, see James Gib-
son, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007). 
 175 Stadler, supra note 30, at 440.  
 176 For an overview of the rule-standard distinction, see Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 
35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 22–29 (1967); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analy-
sis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudica-
tion, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687–1701 (1976); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 
Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992); and Cass R. 
Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995). 
 177 See Kaplow, supra note 176, at 560. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1503 
(2007). 
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tlement to its underlying purpose and function.180  This is especially 
true when it comes to standards that work to limit an entitlement.  In-
centives tend to vary from one inventor or creator to another or one 
area of application to another, necessitating significant contextual fine-
tuning.181  In these contexts, a bright-line rule would prove insufficient 
for creators and inventors who need ex ante incentives in excess of the 
curtailed entitlement, since the curtailment would be known upfront.  
While a standard would not necessarily limit the entitlement any less 
than an equivalent rule, it would only ever curtail the entitlement ex 
post, thereby providing the creator or inventor with the necessary (but 
probabilistic) incentive upfront.  One might thus call this the perverse 
effect of uncertainty on incentives.  Because a creator or inventor does 
not know ex ante that the entitlement is likely to exclude certain 
things, the impact that the standard has on his incentive is minimal. 
Indeed, this has long been recognized to be true in the patent law 
context.  Patent law, much like copyright law, is concerned with pro-
viding inventors with an incentive in the nature of an exclusionary 
right.  Since the process of innovation with which patent law is  
concerned tends to entail greater investment of time and effort, the  
incentive that it needs to provide to innovators has to be much 
stronger — as manifested in the scope and coverage of its exclusionary 
rights framework.182  Anything weaker than these broad incentives is 
unlikely to result in the necessary investment of resources into the 
process of innovation.  Notwithstanding the need for these strong in-
centives, scholars have argued that standards-based ex post limits on 
patent law’s grant of an exclusionary right are likely to have little im-
pact on the original incentive.  This analysis is particularly instructive 
here. 
Patent rights are inherently probabilistic by nature.  Their exis-
tence, validity, and scope are contingent on a host of considerations, 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 180 This distinction between rules and standards translates most directly into the difference be-
tween the strategies of “exclusion” and “governance” that property law uses to allocate and en-
force its grant of rights.  See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for 
Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453 (2002).  Exclusion strategies such as tres-
pass, much like rules, entail high upfront delineation costs and low ex post enforcement costs, 
while governance strategies such as nuisance do just the opposite.  See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion 
and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965 (2004).  Governance strategies 
enable courts to carry out balancing exercises as circumstances demand and thereby contextualize 
the entitlement to an exogenously defined purpose.  
 181 Michael Carroll identifies this as the problem of “uniformity cost” in intellectual property 
law and notes that context-specific standards serve to minimize these costs.  See Michael W. Car-
roll, One For All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U. L. 
REV. 845, 856–61, 890–92 (2006). 
 182 This is seen most prominently in the absence of an independent invention defense and a fair 
use limitation in patent law.  For more on this, see Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of 
Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1184–87 (2000). 
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most of which are outside the owner’s (that is, creator’s) control.183  
Uncertainty thus manifests itself in more ways than one until the right 
is adjudicated.  Consequently, contingent ex post limits have little im-
pact on the original incentive, given the extent of uncertainty that al-
ready exists.  In a counterintuitive move, Professors Ian Ayres and 
Paul Klemperer argue that increasing patent law’s overall uncertainty 
through underinclusive standards, as opposed to overinclusive rules, in 
order to reduce the system’s predictability, is likely to curb monopolis-
tic pricing without impacting a patentee’s original incentive.184  They 
thus advocate the use of standards-based doctrines such as the “reverse 
doctrine of equivalence,” which allows a defendant to avoid liability ex 
post by showing that his actions were not within the “principle” of the 
claimed invention, even though they fall within its scope when literally 
construed.185  Such doctrines, they argue, have little effect on a pat-
entee’s original incentive to invest resources into the innovation proc-
ess, even though the possibility of their being used later on (to diminish 
the entitlement) is known upfront.186  Since their invocation and use 
depend on events, the occurrence of which are inherently unpredict-
able — that is, unforeseeable — they have little impact on a patentee’s 
ex ante incentives. 
To be sure, Ayres and Klemperer recognize that this increase in the 
uncertainty of enforcement needs to be compensated in order to avoid 
interfering significantly with an innovator’s incentive.187  Consequent-
ly, they advocate extending a patent’s duration — again ex post — to 
offset any increased uncertainty, using a system of Ramsey pricing.188  
They propose implementing this part of their model by allowing pat-
entees to leverage their power into the future, or alternatively expand-
ing the geographic or product scope of the patent.189  In the copyright 
context, the Ramsey intuition side of their model could be imple-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 183 On the probabilistic nature of property and intellectual property rights, see Mark A. Lemley 
& Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75 (2005); and Keith Leffler & Cristo-
fer Leffler, The Probabilistic Nature of Patent Rights: In Response to Kevin McDonald, ANTI-
TRUST, Summer 2003, at 77. 
 184 See Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing In-
novation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 985 (1999). 
 185 Id. at 1025. 
 186 Id. at 1025–26. 
 187 Id. at 1001. 
 188 Id. at 1026–27.  Ramsey pricing involves pricing goods inversely to the elasticity of demand 
for the firm’s products but without a profit constraint.  See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 20, at 
40 n.6.  Translated to the intellectual property context, this concept implies that if a monopolist’s 
profits are held constant, “consumers would be better off living under oligopolistic pricing for a 
longer period than monopoly pricing for a shorter period.”  Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 184, at 
991.  The deadweight losses, then, get spread over a long duration, but their severity at any given 
point in time is reduced.   
 189 Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 184, at 1026–28. 
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mented in more ways than one.  First, if enhancing copyright’s term of 
protection is indeed a possible offset, one might argue that this effect is 
in some ways already in place, given the periodicity with which Con-
gress extends terms retroactively without a valid empirical basis for 
the extension.  Using the Ayres-Klemperer framework, current copy-
right policy already reflects elements of staggered-duration Ramsey 
pricing, making the introduction of additional uncertainty,  
via a foreseeability test, the equivalent of their “stationarity intui-
tion.”190  In the alternative, another option would certainly lie in 
minimizing reliance on the currently incomprehensible fair use doc-
trine — something the foreseeability test is likely to achieve on its own 
by moving most of these fair use–related issues to the entitlement de-
lineation process. 
In more simple terms, Professor Robert Merges argues that the re-
verse doctrine of equivalents, as an ex post limit, is likely to have no 
more than a minimal effect on the original incentive, given the numer-
ous other contingencies that the patentee is faced with even before that 
stage is reached.191  The inherently probabilistic nature of the rights 
bundle thus generates sufficient uncertainty on its own, such that the 
uncertainty that the vague standard adds to it is marginal. 
Others such as Professors Michael Meurer and Craig Nard go one 
step further.  They argue that limiting patent law’s doctrine of equiva-
lents — which allows a patentee to control uses of the invention that 
were not foreseeable and therefore not literally covered by the patent’s 
claims — is likely to have little to no impact on the original incen-
tive.192  They argue that as long as the entitlement allows the inventor 
to cover her “appreciation of industry and technology trends,” curtail-
ing the entitlement ex post, by eliminating unforeseeable developments 
from its coverage, is unlikely to have an appreciable impact on incen-
tives.193  They thus observe that the “incentive is not harmed much 
when, ex post, [an inventor] is denied [protection] over technology that 
she did not foresee ex ante.”194 
Since carving unforeseeable uses out of the entitlement ex post is 
not thought to be problematic in the context of patents, where the in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 190 See id. at 989–90.  This is the intuition that small deviations from a monopolist’s profit-
maximizing price or quantity will have less of an effect on a monopolist’s overall benefits, but will 
have a larger effect on minimizing deadweight losses, thereby producing a net welfare gain.  
 191 Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Block-
ing Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 101–03 (1994). 
 192 See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: 
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1996–97 (2005); see also 
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 50 (2001). 
 193 Meurer & Nard, supra note 192, at 1997. 
 194 Id. at 1998. 
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centive is much closer to the ideal of perfect control, it is indeed more 
than plausible that a similar limit is likely to be even less problematic 
in the copyright context.  First, copyright’s entitlement structure is cer-
tainly more contingent or probabilistic than is its equivalent in patent 
law.  The absence of an administrative agency validating the grant at 
first instance, coupled with copyright’s emphasis on a showing of ac-
tual and actionable copying, make its grant more uncertain.  Second, 
our focus here is on the impact that a foreseeability limit is likely to 
have on unpredictable expectations.  To the extent that these expecta-
tions are not based on industry and technology trends but rather on 
stochastic occurrences whose probabilities are not ascertainable, they 
only ever enter the equation with a very high initial level of uncer-
tainty.  Consequently, any additional uncertainty that the test as an ex 
post standard will introduce so as to diminish the overall incentive is 
likely to be insignificant. 
Additionally, ex post, indeterminate constraints on exclusivity are 
rather well known in copyright law, in the form of the fair use  
doctrine.195  Structured as a standard, it too renders copyright’s grant 
of exclusivity contingent on factors that are often outside a creator’s 
control and in many ways unpredictable.196  In circumstances where  
a court concludes that the defendant’s use is sufficiently transforma-
tive, or substantially noninfringing, fair use effectively circumscribes 
the grant ex post.  Few argue that fair use needs to be eliminated  
because its contextual ex post uncertainty interferes with creator incen-
tives.197  The uncertainty of the standard, if anything, is likely to deter 
potential users (that is, potential infringers) from treading too close to  
the boundaries of impermissible copying.198  Indirectly, therefore, the 
uncertainty associated with the foreseeable copying test is likely  
to preserve creators’ original incentives by deterring significant  
infringement. 
What is more likely to interfere with creators’ original incentives is 
a bright-line rule that limits copyright’s grant ex ante.  Proposals 
aimed at contextually limiting a copyright holder’s bundle of rights ex 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 195 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 196 See Douglas Lichtman, Property Rights in Emerging Platform Technologies, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 615, 637–38 (2000) (observing that fair use excuses infringement whenever “public policy 
favors that result,” id. at 637, and that it is an “all-inclusive, equitable inquiry,” id. at 638). 
 197 To the contrary, the dominant view appears to be that the fair use doctrine stifles innovation 
by not allowing defendants sufficient leeway to use protected works.  See, e.g., Kevin M. Lemley, 
The Innovative Medium Defense: A Doctrine To Promote the Multiple Goals of Copyright in the 
Wake of Advancing Digital Technologies, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 111, 128–29 (2005); Adrienne J. 
Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards To Apply, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 
635, 643–44 (1984). 
 198 See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 179, at 1498 (noting that “the vagueness of the 
fair use standard” causes actors to “err on the side of safety and either overcomply (by minimizing 
the use of protected works) or overinvest in precautions”). 
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ante suffer from this drawback.  Consequently, an ex post standard is 
preferable to a bright-line rule that would limit the grant ex ante and 
thereby interfere with a creator’s incentives, as others have noted in 
the patent context.199 
If copyright’s incentive structure thus entails avoiding any harm to 
creators’ expectations, regardless of their bases, structuring the fore-
seeability test as a fuzzy standard will ensure that any impact it is 
likely to have on these expectations is, at best, marginal. 
2.  Prospect Theory. — A second argument derives from a variant 
of incentive theory that finds application in the world of patents and is 
commonly referred to as the “prospect theory.”200  According to this 
theory, the exclusive rights regime operates much like a mineral pros-
pecting system with the creator being given an incentive to invest fur-
ther in the creation and improve upon it, without fear that free-riders 
will appropriate the benefits of it.201  While the theory originated in 
the context of patents, it is often employed as a justificatory device in 
copyright law.202 
The prospect argument assumes that giving creators greater control 
ex ante incentivizes their own actual development of efficient uses ex 
post.203  It thus ties in with what some describe as copyright’s distribu-
tional incentive — the idea that copyright exists to give creators an in-
centive to both create and distribute their work publicly.  Control over 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 199 See Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 184, at 1024 (noting how underinclusive standards are 
preferable to rules and overinclusive standards).  Quite apart from interfering with creator incen-
tives, replacing the current standards-based approach with a rule-based one would also likely al-
ter a copyright owner’s willingness to bargain with a potential user, as a consequence of the  
uncertainty being eliminated altogether.  See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace,  
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 140 (1999); cf. Jason Scott Johnston, Bargaining Under Rules Versus 
Standards, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 256, 258 (1995).  But cf. Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra  
note 179, at 1502 (advocating the introduction of specific contextual fair use rules into copyright  
doctrine). 
 200 The prospect theory is attributed to the work of Professor Edmund Kitch.  See Edmund W. 
Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977); see also John 
F. Duffy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (2004).  This theory 
bears no connection to the prospect theory in behavioral economics.  See Daniel Kahneman & 
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 
(1979). 
 201 Kitch, supra note 200, at 266. 
 202 See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. 
L. REV. 989, 1047 (1997) (“While Kitch makes his argument in the patent context, it is copyright 
rather than patent law that seems to have taken his theory to heart.”).  Professor Michael  
Abramowicz argues that the dominant theme in the prospect theory is the idea of avoiding waste-
ful rent dissipation, and attempts to use it to explain copyright law’s protection for derivative 
works.  See Michael Abramowicz, A Theory of Copyright’s Derivative Right and Related Doc-
trines, 90 MINN. L. REV. 317, 351, 355–56 (2005). 
 203 See Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 129, 132–35 (2004) (describing the use of this theory to justify copyright’s retrospec-
tive term extension under the CTEA). 
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unforeseeable uses, it might be argued, gives them an incentive to de-
velop aftermarkets that were not obvious to them at the time of crea-
tion.  One might thus characterize the argument as one relating to an 
ex post incentive.204 
First, it is not readily apparent why a creator is best placed to con-
trol and direct future development of the creation.205  Historically, the 
most beneficial new uses for works and ideas have almost never come 
from creators and inventors of the originals.206  Most new uses entail 
the development of new technologies of distribution and thus involve 
inventive processes unconnected with those of a creator, which are 
more likely to be artistic or literary.  Consequently, barring entities that 
engage in both creativity and research into new mechanisms of distri-
bution — unquestionably a small minority — the two are unlikely to 
go together.  The process of creation in copyright law is additionally 
far less resource intensive than is the process of developing new 
mechanisms (that is, technologies) of distribution.  As a result, there 
seems little reason to believe that the creator of an expressive work is 
best placed to invest in the management or development of new uses 
for that work, when that investment is likely to be orthogonal to, and 
far in excess of, the one made for the original creation.  Thus, for in-
stance, it is not clear why the Beatles (or any music group) might have 
been expected to invest in the development of digital recording just 
because they created the expressive work that is the subject of the re-
cording.  Unlike in patent law, there remains little basis to believe that 
the original creator is best positioned to develop new uses, a fact that 
is borne out vividly in copyright cases involving new uses.207 
In response, it might be argued that even if creators themselves are 
not best placed to invest in further development, they might license 
this out to others; copyright’s grant of exclusivity then becomes neces-
sary to incentivize these others to invest in the development process.  
In this formulation, exclusivity in the post-creation market functions as 
a distributional incentive, not for creators, but rather for independent 
distributors such as record companies. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 204 Id. at 132. 
 205 Id. at 135–36.  As Professor Mark Lemley rightly notes, this logic flies in the face of the 
fundamental idea that competition — and deconcentration in markets — is preferable for simple 
efficiency reasons.  Indeed, this principle dominates antitrust law’s prohibition on tying and other 
forms of exclusive dealing arrangements.  For a few academic articles discussing tying, see Ward 
S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957); Jay Pil 
Choi, Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements, 114 ECON. J. 83 (2004); 
and Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469 (2001). 
 206 See Lemley, supra note 203, at 137 & n.29.  He notes: “Creators are often terrible managers. 
They frequently misunderstand the significance of their own invention and the uses to which it 
can be put.”  Id. at 137. 
 207 See cases cited supra note 3. 
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Even if distributors do need an incentive to invest in developing 
the market for new distribution mechanisms, it seems to make little 
sense to vest it in the creator on the assumption that the rights will 
come to be allocated most efficiently.  In a world of zero transaction 
costs, this would indeed make no difference, but where these costs are 
significant and remain coupled with the problem of potential holdouts 
(for example, a creator refusing to license the work to a distributor for 
whimsical reasons), the argument seems fairly problematic.  If distri-
butional incentives are indeed necessary, a more plausible basis for 
them might lie in creating an independent entitlement and vesting it in 
the distributor directly.208 
One of the main concerns motivating the prospect theory in the pa-
tent context is the idea that if an inventor is not allowed to control fu-
ture uses and development of the invention early on, this is likely to 
result in wasteful duplicative efforts among inventors.  An improver 
might decide to take the inventor’s nascent idea and develop and 
commercialize it, regardless of the fact that the inventor is doing the 
exact same thing (perhaps in the belief that he is likely to be the first 
to do so).  This, the prospect theory argues, results in a redundancy, or 
deadweight loss, that has no social benefit.209  Multiple inventors 
might expend resources, not just to get the initial patent monopoly, but 
also later on, to improve and commercially develop the invention.  
Since such efforts are likely to be wasteful, the prospect theory argues 
for a forward-looking patent regime that extends a patentee’s grant 
beyond the immediate idea to unforeseeable uses of it as well.210 
This concern with redundancy sits somewhat oddly within the 
broader scheme of copyright policy, which otherwise actively encour-
ages such redundancies.  Copyright’s defense of independent creation 
has long been identified as one of its defining features, and one that 
sets it apart from patent.211  Perhaps more importantly, copyright law 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 208 Indeed, a new set of rights referred to as “neighboring rights” or “related rights” attempts to 
do precisely this by giving distributors exclusionary control over their investments.  See Shyam-
krishna Balganesh, The Social Costs of Property Rights in Broadcast (and Cable) Signals, 22 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1303, 1305–06 (2008).  The most well-known neighboring rights are per-
formers’ rights, phonogram producers’ rights, and broadcasters’ rights.  See id. passim; George 
H.C. Bodenhausen, Protection of “Neighboring Rights,” LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 
1954, at 156.  
 209 See Abramowicz, supra note 202, at 352 (“In the absence of patent protection . . . [m]ore in-
ventors may pursue a particular line of research than is socially optimal.”). 
 210 See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. REV. 
305, 318–20 (1992). 
 211 For an overview of the doctrine and an economic explanation for it in terms of information 
cost theory, see Clarisa Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465, 
528–29 (2004); and Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property As Property: Delineating Entitlements 
in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1810–11 (2007).  For an attempt to extend the idea to patent 
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has long avoided according protection to ideas, with the result that  
expressive variations that rely on a single idea are tolerated, even 
when actively copied.212  If the law recognizes and tolerates multiple 
versions in these different contexts, it seems unlikely to find the devel-
opment of a use that the creator could not identify as being problem-
atic or redundant in the sense that patent law might.  In addition, the 
law actively tolerates (and encourages) duplicative expressions of the 
same idea.  Indeed, when the possibility of such redundancy is not 
deemed sufficient to interfere with copyright’s original incentive (that 
is, to create), its interference with ex post incentives through a loosen-
ing of control over unforeseeable uses is likely to be negligible, if not 
nonexistent. 
In many ways, then, the prospect theory operates on assumptions 
that seem alien to copyright’s general structure, and perhaps more im-
portantly, to the peculiarities of unforeseeable uses in the context of 
expressive works. 
* * * 
A requirement of foreseeability — whereby a creator is denied con-
trol over unforeseeable uses of the work — is unlikely to interfere sig-
nificantly with his original incentive to create the work.  The impact it 
is likely to have, if any, is marginal.  To the contrary, one might argue, 
the rule is likely to generate a new kind of incentive among creators. 
The foreseeability test is in the end an objective one, dependent on 
the general state of knowledge at the time of creation, which is then 
imputed to the creator.  Consequently, in situations where the creator 
is best positioned to generate this level of knowledge, the test incentiv-
izes the creator to actually make it widely known.  Take the case of a 
company that invests in the development of both software and hard-
ware technologies.  Assume that the company were to develop a new 
software program that meets the requirements for copyright protec-
tion, and that it foresees the possibility of the program finding applica-
tion in a new platform (in addition to those in existence) that it is in 
the process of developing.  Instead of being able to keep the new plat-
form (or the technology that it is likely to employ there) completely se-
cret, the requirement would force it to generate an objective level of 
knowledge about the platform.  This could include simple trade jour-
nal publications or other research disclosures where it describes the 
basis of the new platform’s use of the copyrighted work (that is, the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
law, see Samson Vermont, Independent Invention As a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 
MICH. L. REV. 475 (2006). 
 212 See Abramowicz, supra note 202, at 355 (referring to the idea-expression dichotomy in  
copyright). 
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software).213  Disclosures of this kind are likely to be of immense bene-
fit socially, and the principle of foreseeability would create an active 
incentive for it.  By making the scope of liability depend on the plain-
tiff’s disclosure of possible uses in situations where the plaintiff is in-
deed in the best position to foresee new uses, the requirement would 
create an ex ante incentive to disseminate information relating to pos-
sible uses widely. 
Foreseeability as an information-generating incentive performs a 
function that is the mirror image of its role in tort law.  In the absence 
of a foreseeability limit, tort law would have individuals devoting 
needless time and energy to assessing the probabilities of remote events 
in order to avoid liability.214  In the copyright context, by contrast, 
there is a potential benefit (as opposed to liability) and perhaps more 
importantly, a basic recognition that the additional information gener-
ated (or likely to be generated) is socially beneficial rather than waste-
ful.  In this latter respect, foreseeable copying resembles the rule in 
Hadley.215  A creator’s acquisition of knowledge that his work could 
be used in relation to a new platform technology that is in the process 
of being developed is clearly different from a potential tortfeasor 
spending resources to know that his actions could trigger an infinite 
variety of harms or injuries among individuals in the vicinity of his ac-
tions.  A foreseeability rule in the context of copyright creates an in-
centive to generate the former, just as a foreseeability rule in the con-
text of torts operates to deter the latter. 
V.  OBJECTIONS 
Having examined how a test of foreseeability might work in the 
copyright context, its likely impact on creator incentives, and the man-
ner in which courts might implement it, this Part examines four poten-
tial objections that may be raised to such a test.  They are that: (1) a 
foreseeability limit renders copyright’s term of protection meaningless, 
(2) as a standard it is indeterminate, (3) it will result in the scope of 
protection varying with the point in time that a work was created, and 
finally (4) it is likely to rely heavily on hindsight. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 213 Of course, the system would not want inventors to disclose information such that other sys-
tems of intellectual property (that is, patents and trade secrets) might later deny them protection.  
An alternative might thus be a mechanism for creators to make these disclosures to an adminis-
trative agency under conditions of secrecy; here, however, the social benefits of the disclosure are 
unlikely to be realized. 
 214 See Zipursky, supra note 108, at 47 (noting how the acquisition of such information is “so-
cially inefficient”). 
 215 See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liability for 
Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 284, 286 (1991) (ob-
serving that when one party’s communication of information to the other is “socially desirable,” 
the foreseeability requirement in Hadley provides an incentive for it). 
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A.  Term Redundancy 
Since 1950, Congress has extended copyright’s term of protection 
twelve times, and today works are protected for the life of the author 
plus seventy years.216  On its face, one might argue, a test of foresee-
ability will by necessity come to limit this duration.  No creator can 
expect to foresee uses to which the work may be put nine decades into 
the future; consequently, copyright’s long term of protection becomes 
somewhat redundant.  The existence of an extended period of protec-
tion might be taken as evidence of an intent to protect unforeseeable 
uses as well. 
It is precisely the existence of this abnormally long period of protec-
tion that justifies nontemporal limits on copyright.  In the world of in-
tellectual property, the existence of tradeoffs between term and extent 
remains somewhat well known.  Thus, while patent law gives inven-
tors a set of exclusive rights for no more than twenty years (unlike 
copyright’s seventy), the extent and coverage of those rights are far 
wider than those of copyright.217  Unlike copyright, patent rights are 
not limited by numerous subject-matter limits and purpose-based ex-
ceptions, which is taken to justify the correspondingly short term of 
protection.218  Copyright’s extended term is therefore a policy reason 
to relax rather than strengthen its coverage nontemporally. 
The frequency with which Congress has extended copyright’s term, 
yet left intact its basic entitlement structure — without seeking to take 
it in the direction of patent law — is perhaps additionally indicative of 
its acceptance of (or acquiescence in) judicially created, non-term re-
lated, limiting devices. 
In addition, tailoring the scope of the entitlement bundle on a case-
by-case basis (instead of tinkering around with duration) does, from a 
policy perspective, address an added concern: uniformity costs, or the 
fact that different types of creativity and different creators have vastly 
different incentive structures, which a one-size-fits-all approach to en-
titlement delineation glosses over.219  Thus, a life-plus-forty year term 
of protection may be well in excess of what a movie producer needs as 
an incentive to produce the work, but may on the other hand be in-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 216 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).  For anonymous works, the term of protection is 95 years from the 
year of first publication, or 120 years from the year of its first creation, whichever expires earlier.  
Id. § 302(c).  The most recent extension, the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), 
was the subject matter of a well-known Supreme Court decision.  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 
U.S. 186 (2003). 
 217 See Smith, supra note 211, at 1806–14 (discussing these differences); see also William M. 
Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
OF THE LAW 83, 94–96 (Donald A. Wittman ed., 2003). 
 218 See Smith, supra note 211, at 1812. 
 219 See Carroll, supra note 181, at 852–56; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent Law, the Fed-
eral Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 5 (2004). 
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adequate for a musician.220  Here, a foreseeability limit allows the enti-
tlement to track the incentive on a significantly more granular basis.  
Indeed, one might argue that it compensates for the intrinsic redun-
dancy of a uniform term limit. 
B.  Potential Indeterminacy 
A second and perhaps more basic objection to the proposed mod- 
el derives from the flexibility inherent in the idea of foreseeability.  
This objection might proceed as follows.  Ascertaining whether a de-
fendant’s copying is foreseeable or not is dependent on the specificity 
with which the form or mechanism of copying is described.  Conse-
quently, the same action might be classified as foreseeable or unfore-
seeable depending on a judge’s description of it — rendering its appli-
cation grossly inconsistent. 
An argument along these lines is somewhat well known in relation 
to foreseeability’s use in tort law.221  Referred to as the “multiple de-
scription” problem, it postulates that speaking of foreseeability is mea-
ningless in the absence of individuals having a system of shared mean-
ing that they adhere to in their description of an event.222  Given the 
fact that the foreseeability of an event (or use) is only ever recon-
structed ex post, when additional details are known, judges and juries 
are likely to come to different conclusions on the same set of facts, de-
pending entirely on their descriptions of the event. 
To the extent that foreseeability depends on an individual’s descrip-
tion of an event, it certainly is subject to some amount of indetermi-
nacy.223  Yet the fact of the matter remains that at some basic level, 
individuals do share a common set of conceptual meanings in under-
standing the way the world works.  Most of tort law, and indeed the 
common law, takes this for granted, and it would seem somewhat in-
consistent to argue that foreseeability will fall prey to a level of inde-
terminacy any greater than that fostered by current common law de-
vices.  In the context of tort law, Professors H.L.A. Hart and Tony 
Honoré thus argue: 
 [T]o avoid fallacies, the first question to ask is not “Was this harm fore-
seeable?” but “Under what specific description which fits this harm has 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 220 See Carroll, supra note 181, at 856–57 (distinguishing between Type I and Type II errors 
associated with uniformity). 
 221 See Perry, supra note 137, at 99–101; see also Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: 
Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 124 (1989) (noting how 
foreseeability “utterly lacks the descriptive content that allows it to be the principled basis for  
decision”). 
 222 See Michael S. Moore, Foreseeing Harm Opaquely, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL 
LAW 125, 126 (Stephen Shute et al. eds., 1993); see also Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and 
Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 198 (1952). 
 223 See CLARENCE MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 174–77 (1953). 
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experience taught us to anticipate harm?”  If we have learned from experi-
ence to expect a “rainstorm” on seeing dark clouds, then the rainstorm was 
foreseeable even if, when it occurs, it has other characteristics . . . .224 
Foreseeability thus places reliance on the existence of a common 
meaning system among similarly situated individuals that derives from 
shared experience.  Descriptive variations thus do not correspond to 
the reality that individuals tend to view the world (and respond to 
stimuli in it) in similar ways.  In studying human perception, noted 
linguistic philosopher J.L. Austin observes that individuals tend to 
“perceive” the world and understand themselves to be doing so in 
roughly similar ways — in terms of what he called “moderate-sized 
specimens of dry goods” or “familiar objects.”225  The existence of a 
basic meaning structure is thus central to much of the law’s conceptual 
framework and, to the extent that it might be characterized as inde-
terminate, so too is foreseeability. 
The idea of a shared system of meaning is in many ways central to 
current copyright doctrine.  In the context of substantial similarity, for 
instance, courts have long recognized that dissimilarities, while rele-
vant to the inquiry, are to be differentiated into trivial and nontrivial 
ones, the former being understood as those that involve modifications 
to noncentral parts of the work.226  Whether something is a trivial 
modification or not is inevitably a qualitative assessment, based on 
what a court perceives to be central to the protected work.  The test of 
foreseeable copying would ask courts to do no more than extend that 
logic beyond just the work, to its broader context or medium of use. 
C.  Time-Specific Protection 
Should a work created in 1930 be protected any differently from 
one created in 1995?  The test of foreseeable copying attempts to mod-
el a creator’s entitlement by reference to objectively anticipated mar-
kets at the time a work was created.  And as a consequence, the enti-
tlement will certainly vary depending on the point in time that a work 
was created.  A technology (and therefore the market for works that it 
gives rise to) may not have been capable of anticipation in 1930, but 
certainly may have been so in 1995.  Does this pose problems? 
In situations where either the entitlement or liability derives from 
an individual’s awareness or knowledge, the law rather commonly dif-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 224 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 258 (2d ed. 1985). 
 225 J.L. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA 7–8 (G.J. Warnock ed., 1962) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 226 See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 42, § 13.03[B], at 13-67 to -73; OSTERBERG & OS-
TERBERG, supra note 46, § 2:6, at 2-32 to -34; see also Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 
F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding an alteration in color to be a trivial and insubstantial  
modification). 
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ferentiates based on time in structuring the entitlement.  Consequently, 
describing the problem as one of differential protection begins with the 
major assumption that uniform protection is indeed universally desir-
able, which clearly is not the case when the law is directed at generat-
ing an ex ante incentive.  Thus, for instance, in the context of products 
liability, a manufacturer is expected to warn consumers about risks 
and hazards inherent in a product’s use and design, to avoid liability 
for negligence.227  All the same, these risks and hazards are assessed 
based on what the manufacturer either knew or should have known at 
the time of manufacture.  Information that becomes available subse-
quently (that is, as technology develops) is in this conception thought 
to have no bearing on the question of liability, since a manufacturer 
could not have been expected to warn consumers about risks that were 
objectively incapable of being anticipated when the product was 
manufactured.228  Indeed, studies have shown that allowing this ex 
post information to influence the liability determination often skews 
the ex ante incentive to take due care in making the disclosure — 
which the regime is directed at generating.229  To the extent that the 
regime values the creation of this incentive, fixing a temporal cutoff 
for information becomes necessary.  Since liability here relates to an ex 
ante action (the failure to warn at the time of manufacture or sale), it 
is modeled solely on the basis of the “state of the art” at the time of 
that action.  It thus is not considered unfair, from the incentive-
generating perspective, that a manufacturer of a product in 1970 is not 
found liable for a failure to issue a warning based on information that 
became available in 1980, but a manufacturer of the same product in 
1990 certainly is.  The same is equally true in the context of profes-
sional negligence, where standards often evolve over time, yet liability 
(based on reasonable foreseeability) is based on information available 
at the time of action. 
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 227 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 103, § 96, at 685.  This position is often referred to as the 
“state-of-the-art defense” to products liability.  It should be noted that courts and scholars have 
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 228 KEETON ET AL., supra note 103, § 96, at 685 (“[I]t is the state of the art in the sense of the 
scientific knowledge and technological information regarding danger that was available to a seller 
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should have known.”). 
 229 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Should Products Liability Be Based on Hindsight?, 14 J.L. ECON. & 
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Indeed, this idea is fairly well entrenched in patent law too, where 
a PHOSITA’s knowledge and awareness (that is, the “state of the art” 
in order to ascertain nonobviousness) are related back to the time the 
invention was made, thereby disallowing the entry of after-the-event 
information into the entitlement structuring process.230 
If copyright law is in the end about the ex ante incentive to create, 
and the entitlement is presumed to come into existence the moment the 
work is created, it will of necessity vary with time, as the scope and 
extent of those incentives fluctuate.  To posit otherwise would, in a 
sense, convert copyright into a doctrine of simple misappropriation, 
where the point at which the entitlement comes into existence becomes 
irrelevant and the focus of the law shifts entirely to what the defen-
dant copied from the plaintiff.231  In this formulation, as should be ap-
parent, the idea of ex ante incentives as the basis for the entitlement 
becomes meaningless, since the entitlement only ever comes into exis-
tence at the time of the misappropriation.  Consequently, to the extent 
that the institution attempts to take seriously its reliance on ex ante in-
centives as a justificatory premise, temporally differentiated entitle-
ments are not just unavoidable, but necessary. 
D.  Hindsight Bias 
A fourth possible objection derives from a more nuanced under-
standing of individual decisionmaking and the cognitive biases that 
occur therein.  Hindsight bias refers to the general tendency among in-
dividuals to see an event that has occurred as more probable than it 
actually was before its occurrence.232  The presence of information 
about an outcome thus produces an unjustified increase in its per-
ceived predictability.233  Given copyright law’s ex post process of enti-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 230 For opinions emphasizing the importance of relating the inquiry back in time to the point of 
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tlement delineation, any attempt to reconstruct a creator’s foresight at 
the time of creation will inevitably be influenced by information pos-
sessed by the decisionmaker that was not available to the creator ex 
ante.  Judges will therefore be more inclined to view a defendant’s 
copying as foreseeable to the plaintiff at the time of creation when pre-
sented with actual evidence of the copying. 
In the related context of patent law, while determining the validity 
of a patent, courts are required to determine whether the patentee’s 
idea was nonobvious (to a skilled person) at the time of its inven-
tion.234  It thus entails a similar retrospective reconstruction of an  
actor’s likely foresight.  In that context, studies have shown that hind-
sight tends to play a major role.235  Given the structural similarity be-
tween the nonobviousness inquiry and the proposed foreseeability test 
in copyright law, the same consequence is likely to occur in the latter. 
As a structural matter, copyright lends itself almost perfectly to the 
possibility of hindsight bias.  Since the existence and scope of the enti-
tlement in a work are only ever decided when the defendant copies 
parts of it, the presence of actual copying (appropriation) tends to hurt 
the defendant’s case.  Indeed, as a historical matter, courts seem to 
have acknowledged their reliance on hindsight with observations like 
“what is worth copying is prima facie worth protecting.”236  A similar 
situation, one might argue, is likely to occur in relation to the test of 
foreseeable copying.  Courts would be asked to determine whether a 
particular form of copying was foreseeable in the past, yet they are 
likely to make the determination with the market for the form of copy-
ing actually before them.  To the extent that copyright law remains 
structurally different from both patent and trademark law in its ex 
post entitlement delineation, the test of foreseeability is likely to play 
into the deficiencies of the existent system. 
As scholars have long noted in several different contexts, hindsight 
bias is indeed an inevitable consequence of any ex post liability and 
entitlement delineation process.237  Studies have also shown that debi-
asing techniques — which often involve information-filtering devices 
— are largely ineffective in controlling hindsight bias.238  As a conse-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
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quence, it has been argued that the most effective way to deal with 
hindsight bias involves acknowledging its presence in the process and 
thereupon adapting the process based on this realization,239 but even 
this approach cannot wholly eliminate the bias. 
A large part of what contributes to hindsight bias in the use of 
open-ended standards such as “reasonableness” or “foreseeability” gen-
erally is the absence of a specific point in time at which to anchor the 
ex post reconstruction of the ex ante event or action.  As a conse-
quence, the presumptive ex ante world begins to assume features of 
the ex post.  One of the most common ways that courts attempt to con-
trol the influence of hindsight bias in ex post decisionmaking is 
through the use of indicators for the determination that are fixed in 
time.  Professor Jeffrey Rachlinski thus notes that courts often develop 
doctrinal mechanisms that attempt to anchor the determination to the 
ex ante world — such as ex ante customary norms (for professional 
negligence), or a long-felt ex ante need for a solution in an industry (in 
patent law’s nonobviousness setting).240 
In a similar vein, foreseeable copying would have the effect of con-
necting the infringement inquiry to the time at which the entitlement 
is deemed to commence (as opposed to the time it is interfered with), 
as a preliminary step.  By emphasizing that a defendant’s copying is 
actionable only if objectively foreseeable to the plaintiff at the time of 
creation, and thereby forcing courts to acknowledge the importance of 
the point of creation, it is likely to shift the focus of the inquiry away 
from the present to the past.  Additionally, the indicators for the test 
that courts would come to use — deriving largely from their deploy-
ment of the foreseeability test in the licensing setting (for example, in-
dustry trends, the relevant state of the art, and so on) — would force 
the inquiry to remain temporally anchored to the time of creation in 
much the same way as other hindsight bias–controlling mechanisms 
attempt to eliminate the influence of subsequent developments on the 
process. 
As with every ex post reconstruction that is clearly a “second-best 
strateg[y],”241 the problem is not likely to be eliminated altogether.  All 
the same, compared to a world in which there exists no mechanism to 
either recognize or control for the bias, a system tempered by a time-
specific foreseeability limit is an obvious improvement. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 239 See id. at 587, 607–24. 
 240 Id. at 607–24. 
 241 Id. at 624. 
 
2009] COPYRIGHT INCENTIVES 1633 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Central to much of the preceding argument is the idea that copy-
right law is not the best way of allocating windfalls associated with 
unforeseeable uses.  In numerous other contexts, the law uses foresee-
ability as a mechanism by which to avoid and reallocate these wind-
falls, in the belief that the costs and benefits associated with them are 
incapable of inducing any significant ex ante behavioral modification 
among individuals.  Given the primacy of these behavioral assump-
tions across different areas of the common law, I have attempted to ar-
gue here that copyright law should be no different. 
To the extent that copyright law continues to rely on a theory of in-
centives and the need to provide creators with an incentive to invest 
time and resources into the creative process, it too attempts to bring 
about ex ante behavioral modification among individuals.  If the be-
havioral assumptions that the common law relies on in a host of other 
areas are indeed true, then copyright law should find little reason to be 
different.  Individuals will not (and cannot) factor the unforeseeable 
consequences of their actions into their ex ante reasons for acting.  
Consequently, limiting copyright’s grant of exclusivity to uses of the 
creative work that were foreseeable to a creator at the time of creation 
is likely to better align creators’ creative decisionmaking with their in-
centives.  The test of foreseeable copying proposed here would thus 
provide copyright law with a device by which to doctrinally instantiate 
its theory of incentives and simultaneously avoid misallocating the 
windfalls that the current system produces.  Using the basic idea that 
individuals have limited predictive capabilities, especially in relation to 
stochastic events, the foreseeable copying test remains premised on 
providing creators with an incentive that is tailored to the exact way 
in which the law presumes individuals to behave in a variety of other 
contexts. 
For far too long, copyright law and policy have centered around the 
rhetoric of incentives and inducements but failed to integrate into doc-
trine the way in which they actually impact human behavior.  It is 
hoped that the present model will contribute to enabling the idea of 
incentives to be more than just of rhetorical significance, or at the very 
least, serve to wean copyright away from its reliance on an illusory 
theory of creator incentives. 
